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As in other countries in the southern Africa region, a human development catastrophe is 
unfolding in Mozambique. Recently released data estimate HIV prevalence rates amongst 
the adult population in the year 2000 at around 12% with substantial regional variation. 
Due to the magnitude of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, it has become a top priority 
development issue. The goal of this paper is to try to come to grips with the economic 
dimensions of the pandemic. In this initial assessment, the focus is on implications for 
macroeconomic prospects. Particular attention is paid to human capital accumulation. 
Taking demographic projections, human capital accumulation projections, and other 
inputs, a recursive computable general equilibrium approach is employed to quantify 
impacts on key macroeconomic variables and identify the major channels through which 
these impacts occur. Policy options for blunting the major negative impact channels are 
also considered. 
 
Due to the long time lags between infection and onset of AIDS, the AIDS case 
projections to 2010 are, barring rapid advance in medical technologies, essentially 
programmed into the system since nearly all of the people projected to die in this decade, 
including the latter parts, are already HIV positive. The analysis indicates that these 
impending AIDS cases and deaths could have large economic impacts. Projecting to 
2010, per capita annual GDP growth rates are between 0.3% and 1.0% lower than in a 
fictional no AIDS scenario. The major sources of this slowdown in growth are (1) 
reduced productivity growth, (2) reduced population growth and human capital 
accumulation, and (3) reduced physical capital accumulation. All three of these effects 
are significant though the productivity effect is the strongest.  
 
Due to a variety of knowledge gaps, a high degree of uncertainty must be associated with 
these results. However, if AIDS indeed reduces per capita economic growth for extended 
periods of time as the analysis suggests, then initiatives that effectively combat AIDS will 
pay handsomely in purely economic terms. Given the nearly decade long time lags 
between infection and death, policy actions can be divided into two categories: a) reactive 
policies to face the ramifications of the pandemic in the current decade and b) preventive 
policies designed to reduce HIV/AIDS prevalence in future decades. 
 
Under reactive policies, education policy was explicitly considered. AIDS poses a threat 
to educational attainment from both the supply and demand sides. AIDS deaths amongst 
teachers and administrators will worsen already severe supply side constraints. In 
addition, widespread orphaning is likely to reduce the demand for education. Both of 
these effects point to reduced school enrollments and human capital accumulation.  
 
The analysis indicates that school enrollments and human capital accumulation rates are 
sensitive to changes in the probabilities of remaining in school and transitioning to higher 
grade levels. The scenario Education, corresponding to a strong policy effort to maintain 
school enrollment rates, graduation rates, and quality, resulted in a 0.6% increment to 
GDP growth by 2010 relative to the Base AIDS scenario. This growth increment is due to    
the enhanced productivity of a more skilled workforce. Furthermore, this increment is 
likely to persist well into the future due to much larger school enrollments in 2010 (for 
example, enrollment in EP2 in the Education scenario in 2010 is about twice the level in 
Base AIDS). Assuming this 0.6% growth increment persists to 2020, net present value 
calculations justify incremental education expenditures on the order of 5% of GDP per 
year from 2002 to 2010 in order to obtain the growth increment.  
 
Similarly, if successful preventive policies substantially reduce AIDS deaths in the next 
decade resulting in a growth benefit of 0.3% per year from 2010 to 2020 (corresponding 
to the lower end of the estimated average per capita GDP growth impact), net present 
value calculations also justify large prevention expenditures (2.5% of GDP from 2002 to 
2007) even if per capita GDP is the sole criteria for evaluating the preventive policies. 
Consideration of individual risk of becoming HIV positive and the human costs of AIDS 
would justify even higher prevention expenditures. 
 
The lesson from these numbers is not that resource allocation on this scale should occur 
since absorptive capacity is an issue. Rather, the point is that initiatives that successfully 
prevent the spread of HIV and combat the economic disruptions of AIDS deaths are 
likely to have a high payoff. Given the extent of the payoff, imaginative initiatives, 
including costly ones, can be considered.  
 
In the final section, these and other relatively broad policy options are considered. 
Policies highlighted for further scrutiny include: elimination of school fees (such as fees 
for textbooks), payments to families in the form of food or cash for enrolling children in 
school, accelerating the general economic reform agenda, administrative and regulatory 
simplification, accelerated efforts to extend labor-saving agricultural technologies, and 
tightly targeted (to teachers for example) use of highly active anti-retroviral therapy 
(HAART).  Widespread use of HAART does not appear to be feasible.  
 
The challenge is in moving beyond general policy ideas (both reactive and preventive) to 
real policy initiatives. This will require careful thought particularly with respect to issues 
of implementation.     
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As in other countries in the southern Africa region, a human development catastrophe is 
unfolding in Mozambique. Recently released data estimate HIV prevalence rates amongst 
the adult population in the year 2000 at around 12% with substantial regional variation 
(see Table 1). Relatively low prevalence rates (about 6%) in some populous northern 
provinces bring down the national average. Rates in the central provinces (Zambezia 
excepted) are very high at around 20%. In the economically important South, rates are 
estimated at about 13%. For at least the southern and central provinces, the projected 
demographic effects are stunning. For example, life expectancy in these provinces by 
2010 is expected to decline to about 36 years as opposed to a projected 50 years in the 
absence of the pandemic (Ministry of Health et al., 2001).  
 
Due to the magnitude of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, it has easily overrun the bounds of a 
pure health issue. Instead, it has become a top priority development issue in the southern 
Africa region, including Mozambique. The goal of this paper is to try to come to grips 
with the implications of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in its economic dimension. In this 
initial assessment, focus is on the implications for macroeconomic prospects. The idea is 
to attempt to quantify impacts on key macroeconomic variables and identify the major 
channels through which these impacts occur.
1 Having done this, one can then consider 
policy options for blunting the major negative impact channels. 
 
The official demographic projections for Mozambique assume an average time lag of 
nine years between infection and death from AIDS. Consequently, the AIDS case 
projections though 2010 are, barring rapid advance in medical technologies, essentially 
programmed into the system since nearly all of the people projected to die in this decade, 
including the latter parts, are already HIV positive. Given the time lags inherent in the 
pandemic, policy actions can be divided into two categories: a) reactive policies to face 
the ramifications of the pandemic in the current decade and b) preventive policies 
designed to reduce HIV/AIDS prevalence in future decades. The period under 
consideration extends to the limits of the official demographic projections (2010) and 
thus pertains to the period where reactive policies are relevant. However, the basic results 
can also be used to consider the implications of preventive policies. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section two discusses the implications of recently 
released HIV prevalence rates and provides more detail on the expected demographic 
impacts of the pandemic using available demographic projections. Section three reviews 
literature focusing on macroeconomic impacts. Section four formally analyzes 
implications for human capital accumulation. Section five presents the economy-wide 
modeling approach including critical assumptions and model scenarios. Section six 
discusses the major results. Section seven summarizes and section eight considers both 
reactive and preventive policy implications.   
                                                 
1 The paper focuses primarily on GDP and GDP per capita despite some well-known limitations of these 
variables. See Arndt and Lewis (2000 and 2001) for a discussion on the limitations of these variables as 
welfare indicators in the context of the AIDS pandemic.  
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Before proceeding, a word on the difficulties encountered in this analysis is appropriate. 
There are many. For example, one can pin hopes on the development of simple, 
inexpensive and effective medical technologies. While a welcome outcome, this appears 
to be an unwise working hypothesis, and it is not adopted in this analysis. Even under the 
assumption of relatively constant medical technology, the demographic impacts of 
HIV/AIDS are quite uncertain as is made clear in the next section. In addition, the links 
between these demographic impacts and economic impacts are far from perfectly 
understood. These uncertainties must be combined with the data limitations associated 
with economic analysis in Mozambique.
2 Finally, the analysis bumps against the limits of 
economics. Ultimately, economics is about the welfare of people; and the science of 
economics is poorly prepared to appropriately measure welfare in the context of a 
pandemic that reduces life expectancy by 15 years in the space of about one decade. For 
these reasons, the following analysis should be viewed as a formal means for arriving at 
qualitative conclusions.  
2. Demographic  Impacts 
 
Adult HIV prevalence rates for the year 2000, based on observations from 20 health posts 
spread around the country including some in rural zones, are presented in Table 1. To 
illustrate some of the uncertainty associated with measures of HIV prevalence rates at the 
national level, rates implied by the earlier set of demographic projections (based on 
observations from only four health posts with none of those located in the northern 
provinces) are shown in the final column of Table 1. Earlier demographic projections 
appear to strongly overestimate prevalence rates in the North. Since the northern 
provinces account for about one third of the population, the new figures revise the 
national adult prevalence rate downwards from 16% to 12%. Average prevalence rates 
are also lower in the Center. However, this is essentially due to a lower prevalence rate in 
Zambezia province. Remaining central provinces essentially conform to the earlier 
projections. Prevalence rates in the South are actually slightly higher than previously 
forecast. Further comparisons of the two sets of projections are presented in Appendix B. 
 
According to the most recent projections, population growth between 2000 and 2010 will 
be only about 1.6% per annum as opposed 2.5% in the absence of the pandemic. By 
2010, the size of the population is expected to be about 90% of the hypothetical no AIDS 
level. Along with the overall size, the structure of the population also changes 
dramatically. As is well known, AIDS strikes primarily individuals in the 20-45 year age 
brackets. These are prime years both in terms of work and family responsibilities. AIDS 
also strikes young children through mother to child transmission (MCT). The probability 
that a pregnant woman who is HIV positive will infect her child, either during pregnancy, 
                                                 
2 Mozambique has made large strides in developing credible data relevant for this analysis. Nevertheless, 
some data gaps persist. For example, knowledge of input-output relationships, particularly for non-
agricultural activities, could be improved. Also, due to the combined effects of war and the differences in 
data collection between centrally planned and market economies, time series are short even by African  
standards. Throughout the paper, I try to point out data limitations and knowledge holes without harping on 
them.   
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during childbirth or through breastfeeding, is roughly 30%.
3 With prevalence rates at 
antenatal clinics in the range of 15% to 30% and a MCT transmission rate of 30%, 
between one and two children in 20 becomes HIV positive through MCT.
4 The remaining 
18 to 19 infants are highly unlikely to contract HIV until they become sexually active. 
 
With high prevalence rates in young adults and children largely not at risk (other than 
through MCT), the number of orphans is set to rise dramatically. Figure one shows 
orphans (maternal, paternal, and double) as a share of the population and as a share of 
children under 15 years of age. By 2010, about one child in four will have lost at least 
one parent. Since children represent a large share of the population, orphans are projected 
to account for about 10% of the population in 2010. These figures on orphaning are 
probably the grimmest figures from a very grim set. 
 
While the figures on orphaning follow logically from the incidence of the epidemic, 
impacts on the dependency ratio (the non-working age population divided by the working 
age population) are less intuitive. If the pandemic mainly strikes young adults in their 
prime working years, then first thought indicates that the dependency ratio should rise 
since the most obvious effect is to reduce the denominator of the ratio. In fact, 
dependency ratios are projected to decline fairly significantly. Figure 2 shows four 
alternative measures of dependency ratios. All four measures are projected to decline by 
about 14% over the 2000 to 2010 period.
5  
 
Four facts underlie this somewhat counter-intuitive result. First, women are more likely 
to be HIV positive than men. In the projections for 2001, women represent about 57% of 
the total HIV positive population. The ratio of HIV positive females to HIV positive 
males is about 1.31. Furthermore, for the 15-24 age group, this ratio is 3.37. So, women 
are more likely to contract HIV, and they tend to contract it earlier in life. This has 
implications for fertility. Second, the population is very youthful. In 2001, about 45% of 
the population was under 15 years of age. Third, even considering MCT, this segment of 
the population has very low HIV prevalence rates. The HIV prevalence rate in 2001 for 
the group under 15 years of age was estimated at about 1.0% (compared to about 12% for 
adults). For the age range 5-14, the prevalence rate is estimated at about 0.2%. Finally, 
even in the absence of drug therapy, there are long time lags between becoming HIV 
positive, the onset of AIDS, and eventual death. As indicated earlier, the demographic 
model underlying the figures illustrated here assumed, for adults, eight years between 
infection and the initial onset of AIDS and a life expectancy of one year thereafter. 
 
Since large numbers of women are projected to develop AIDS and die well before the 
end of their normal childbearing years, birth rates decline rather dramatically. In addition, 
over the span of a decade, many youths will transition to adulthood. Furthermore, even if 
                                                 
3 This is the figure employed in the demographic projections. 
4 Since children infected via MCT tend to develop AIDS and die much more rapidly than adults, these 
figures imply child mortality rates of 50 to 100 per 1000 children due to AIDS alone.  
5 Not all demographic models of countries strongly afflicted by HIV/AIDS produce this decline in the 
dependency ratio. For example, demographic models for South Africa project a relatively constant 
dependency ratio through time.  
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these youths become sexually active and HIV positive early in life, their life horizons still 
extend an additional nine years. This combination of a large group moving into adulthood 
and a reduced birth rate are the primary factors driving down the dependency ratio over 
the period 2000 to 2010. So, at a minimum, the massive orphaning and attendant social 
problems that are projected to occur due to the pandemic will be accompanied by an 
improvement, rather than a worsening, of the overall dependency ratio. This decline in 
the dependency ratio is about the only cheerful news in the entire constellation of facts 
surrounding the pandemic.  
 
Barring a medical miracle, these basic facts also point to the earliest conceivable exit 
from the clutches of the pandemic. If the group currently under 15 can learn to avoid 
becoming HIV positive, the brunt of the pandemic will pass in the space of about a 
decade. The same basic facts, especially the long time lags between infection and onset of 
AIDS, also indicate that the AIDS cases projected over the rest of the decade are 
essentially programmed into the system. Potential macroeconomic impacts over the 
coming decade are the focus of the remainder of the paper. 
3.  The Economics of HIV/AIDS: Literature Review and Impact Channels 
 
Efforts to comprehend the macroeconomic implications of the HIV/AIDS pandemic have 
been appearing in the economics literature for nearly a decade. Examples of early work 
include efforts by Bloom and Mahal (1995); Cuddington, Hancock, and Rogers (1994); 
Cuddington (1993); and Kambou, Devarajan, and Over (1993). In a review of this 
literature, the influential World Bank (1997) report, Confronting AIDS, contained a sub-
section entitled ￿AIDS Has Little Net Macroeconomic Impact￿ (using per capita GDP as 
a metric) reflecting the basic consensus of the literature. 
 
A number of more recent assessments have become considerably less sanguine. In a 
recent cross-country analysis, Bonnel (2000) finds a strong negative association between 
adult HIV prevalence and per capita GDP growth. At an adult prevalence rate of 15%, 
Bonnel finds that annual per capita GDP growth is reduced by about 1%.
6 Arndt and 
Lewis (2000) focus on South Africa and conclude that the macroeconomic impacts could 
be significant. Their base case projects an average decline in the welfare of the surviving 
population in 2010 of around 13% compared with a fictional no-AIDS scenario. In a 
more stylized analysis focused on human capital accumulation, Corrigan, Glomm, and 
MØndez (2000) project a decline in per capita GDP growth of 30-40% for countries with 
infection rates of 15-20% of the adult population. This more pessimistic tone has been 
adopted by many of the author￿s cited in the previous paragraph. For example, Bloom 
(2000) states: ￿the whole economy [in Africa] could unravel ... what is about to come is 
ten times worse.￿
7  
                                                 
6 Dixon, McDonald, and Roberts (2001) provide another recent examination of the relationship between 
AIDS and economic growth using a panel data approach. They are far from optimistic about potential 
macroeconomic impacts; however, in contrast with Bonnel, they find that the macroeconomic impact of the 
pandemic is unclear given available data.   
7 Wils et al. (2001) perform a dynamic analysis of the ￿Mozambique￿s Future￿ that cuts against this more 
pessimistic grain. They recognize the pandemic; however, their base case scenario is surprisingly sanguine.    
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Some of the channels of impact of HIV/AIDS are summarized in Box 1. Recent analysis 
also suggests that the relative importance of the channels indicated in Box 1 depends on 
economic structure in combination with the incidence of the pandemic. For example, in 
their examination of South Africa, Arndt and Lewis (2000) identify budget deficits driven 
by increased spending on health and social programs as a major contributor to the overall 
economic impact. In South Africa, unemployment amongst unskilled and skilled workers 
mutes the effect of a reduced rate of labor stock accumulation in those labor segments. 
Highly skilled labor (human capital) is fully employed and the stock is relatively large; 
however, the incidence of the epidemic is strongly biased towards the unskilled and 
skilled labor segments. As a result, labor accumulation and human capital effects are 
relatively small. 
 
In Mozambique, by contrast, the impact channels are likely to be quite different. In most 
nations in sub-Saharan Africa afflicted by the AIDS pandemic, the budget share of the 
Ministry of Health has changed little and few expect Mozambique to deviate from this 
norm. As a result, health spending is unlikely to drive up budget deficits. In addition, 
Box 1: Potential Channels of HIV/AIDS Impact on the Economy 
For firms: 
 disruption/absenteeism       ⇒ affects overall productivity 
 worker experience down/morbidity    ⇒ affects labor productivity 
 insurance/benefits up       ⇒ affects costs, profits, savings 
For government: 
 AIDS spending up         ⇒ crowds out other spending, deficit 
 economic structure shifts       ⇒ affects tax revenue  
 AIDS and the civil service      ⇒ affects quality of government services 
For households: 
 loss of income/orphans       ⇒ reduced investment, poverty 
 caring for HIV/AIDS victims     ⇒ greater stress on social systems  
For the macro economy: 
 lower physical & human investment   ⇒ reduced growth trajectory 
 slower technical progress      ⇒ reduced growth trajectory  
 6 
investment is primarily funded through foreign funds (e.g., aid and foreign investment). 
Consequently, switching from investment to consumption expenditure by local agents 
will have a muted effect on total investment.
8 These facts indicate that the effect on 
capital accumulation from expenditure switching may be less salient than it was in South 
Africa.  
 
Also in contrast to South Africa, available time use studies indicate that adult 
Mozambicans are engaged in productive activities especially in the informal sector 
(Arndt and Tarp, 2000). The importance of the informal sector is reflected in the national 
accounts where, in 1997, the informal or family sector accounted for more than half of 
the total value of production in the economy. Since adults are generally engaged in 
productive activity, fewer adults implies fewer workers, which translates directly into 
reduced output. In South Africa, on the other hand, fewer unskilled workers might simply 
result in reduced unemployment. Also in contrast to South Africa, HIV prevalence rates 
in Mozambique are, at best, constant across skill classes. Highly skilled people may, in 
fact, exhibit higher prevalence rates.
9  
 
Despite all of the differences, one central conclusion does emerge from the 
macroeconomic analyses performed to date: the long duration of the pandemic is crucial. 
Since the pandemic will endure for an extended period of time, even small impacts on 
rates of accumulation of key variables; such as technical progress, physical capital, and 
human capital; will cumulate over time with potentially substantial implications for the 
economy. Put another way, if the education system is disrupted for one year, relatively 
little is lost and many of these losses can be recouped in subsequent years. If the 
educational system is disrupted for a decade, the economy, at the end of that decade, may 
be significantly smaller; and, perhaps more importantly, economic prospects in 
subsequent decades will be seriously compromised.  
 
For Mozambique, there are real concerns about impacts of the pandemic on the 
educational system and, by extension, on rates of accumulation of human capital. These 
concerns are treated in detail in the next section. 
4.  Human Capital, Development, and AIDS 
4.1  Education and Development 
 
Evidence continues to mount for a strong positive association between education levels 
and productivity growth in both agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. An early review 
of 18 studies focused on agricultural productivity conducted by Lockheed, Jamison, and 
Lau (1980) concluded that education had a significant and positive impact on agricultural 
productivity. However, the authors qualified their results by stating that the effect of 
education was likely to be much stronger in ￿modernizing agricultural environments than 
                                                 
8 Assuming credit constraints preclude massive dissavings. 
9 Gregson, Waddell, and Chandiwana (2001) provide a detailed review of the evidence on the relationship 
between education levels and HIV prevalence.  
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in traditional ones￿ (p. 61). More than two decades later, this qualification still excludes 
much of Africa and almost all of Mozambique.  
 
However, a series of recent microeconomic analyses tends to find a strong association 
between education and agricultural productivity even in traditional African contexts. 
Positive returns were found by Weir and Knight (2000a and 2000b) for Ethiopia, 
Pinckney (1996) for Kenya and Tanzania, and Appleton and Balihuta (1996) for Uganda. 
Furthermore, these studies point to significant education externalities. Put simply, the 
illiterate neighbors of more educated farmers, who tend to be more innovative, benefit by 
simply watching and copying.  
 
In Mozambique, analysis from the 1997 household survey finds indirect evidence of 
strong returns to a complete primary education (completion of EP2) in both rural and 
urban areas. Households with at least one member who has completed primary school 
exhibit substantially higher levels of per capita consumption (Handa, Omar, and Ibraimo 
1998). Since agriculture utterly dominates rural activities in Mozambique, increased 
consumption is fairly strong indirect evidence of increased agricultural productivity. The 
urban per capita consumption increases for households with at least one member who has 
completed primary school are consistent with a number of studies on returns to education 
(see, for example, Psacharopolous 1994 for a review of microeconomic studies and 
Bloom, Canning and Sevilla 2001 for a recent study using macroeconomic panel data).  
 
Existing occupation and wage data for Mozambique also support the notion of strong 
returns to education. The wage for the roughly 60,000 Mozambicans with tertiary 
education exceeds the wage for unskilled agricultural labor, which is by far the largest 
labor category, by a factor of about 35 (Ibraimo 2000 and author￿s calculations). As a 
result of high wages, total payments to highly skilled labor represent about 14% of the 
total wage bill even though the population share of Mozambicans with tertiary education 
is very small. Returns to skilled labor, defined as individuals with an education level of at 
least EP2 but less than tertiary, are also relatively high. In urban zones, the skilled wage 
is on average more than three times the unskilled wage (derived from the 1997 social 
accounting matrix and census employment data). 
 
Since educational attainment is very low and the returns to education are high, the scope 
for education to stimulate economic growth and poverty reduction is relatively high. For 
example, simulations based on estimated relationships from the 1997 household survey 
indicate that ensuring that at least one adult completes primary school increases per 
capita consumption by about 24% and reduces poverty by between 19% and 36% 
depending on the poverty measure employed and the zone (Datt et al., 1998). Evidence 
such as this has made education a key priority (PARPA 2001-2005). Unfortunately, the 
AIDS pandemic poses a threat to enhancing educational attainment from both the supply 
and demand sides.   
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4.2  Education and HIV/AIDS 
 
The AIDS pandemic poses obvious problems to an education sector that is already 
struggling with severe supply-side constraints. Data from the 1997 household survey 
indicate that, in rural Mozambique, approximately two of three households have access to 
a basic primary school (EP1) in their village.
10 Access to an upper primary school 
(through level EP2) is substantially more rare. Only 17% of rural households have an 
upper primary school in their village. This is of real concern since analyses of the 1997 
household survey appear to indicate a threshold effect. As discussed in the previous sub-
section, completion of EP2 by any household member raises per capita consumption of 
members of the household significantly. The effect on per capita consumption of 
completion of EP1 is positive but substantially less strong. Access to secondary schooling 
in rural areas is even more circumscribed with only 2% of rural households having a 
secondary school in the village (Handa, Omar, and Ibraimo 1998).
11  
 
With figures like these, expansion of supply becomes a fairly obvious goal. Handa and 
Simler (2000) assert that, at the moment, expansion of supply should take precedence 
over efforts to increase school quality (through, for example, lowering the student/teacher 
ratio) provided that the supply enhancements are targeted at villages that do not have a 
school and do not have a school nearby (56% of the total villages without schools). 
However, each school requires at least one teacher and teachers are in short supply.  
 
AIDS will worsen the supply constraint. There is little reason to believe that HIV 
prevalence rates amongst teachers and other critical personnel in the education sector 
should be any lower than the prevalence rates in the adult population. Indeed, there is 
some reason to fear that the rate might be higher. As stated by Badcock-Walters and 
Whiteside (2000), ￿the comparatively high incomes, often remote postings and social 
mobility of ￿[educators]￿ has long suggested that they may be of far greater risk than 
the population they serve￿ (p. 2).
12 This fear is confirmed in Zambia where, in 1998, the 
AIDS death rate among educators was 70% higher than that of the 15-49 age group in the 
general population (Badcock-Walters and Whiteside 2000).  
 
Concerns also exist on the demand side. For villages with schools, the main reason cited 
in 1997 (prior to the real onset of the pandemic) for not attending school was the need for 
children to work (Handa, Omar, and Ibraimo 1998). As the AIDS pandemic matures and 
parents fall ill and die, the need for children to work will clearly become more pressing. 
In a review of the literature, UNAIDS (1999) lists taking children out of school as one of 
the four most common household responses to stresses induced by the AIDS pandemic.  
                                                 
10 This level of access to basic primary school is no small achievement considering the devastation wreaked 
by the civil war (Arndt, Jensen, and Tarp, 2000). 
11 It should be noted that the 1997 household survey employed a different definition of a rural household 
than the census. According to the household survey definition, about 80% of the population is rural as 
opposed to 71% from the census. Enhancing access to education in rural areas is thus crucial to expanding 
average educational attainment. 
12 Also see Gregson, Waddell, and Chandiwana (2001).  
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In addition, with the large volume of orphaning that is projected, one can expect large 
numbers of children to be living with friends and relatives. A probit analysis of the 1997 
household data conducted by the author indicates that children who are not the direct 
biological descendant of the household head are significantly less likely to attend school. 
As the number of children living with friends and relatives increases, one would certainly 
not expect this effect to be reduced. More likely, the tendency to keep children of 
relatives and friends at home to work will become more pronounced. 
 
In sum, AIDS can be expected to lower the school age population, reduce the share of the 
school age population that seeks to attend school, and impair the capacity of the 
education system to deliver on its mandate. All of these factors point to a reduced rate of 
human capital accumulation. It is possible that the education system could function 
reasonably well at this reduced rate. With reduced supply and reduced demand, supply 
might be adequate to cope with current demand. However, this is unlikely. Much more 
likely, demand constraints will bind in some areas and supply constraints in others 
leaving the system to operate well below potential capacity. Nimble management of the 
sector could help substantially; however, managerial capacity is already thin and not 
immune to AIDS. For example, Badcock-Walters and Whiteside (2000), while concerned 
about deaths amongst teachers, worry even more about a ￿catastrophic￿ erosion of the 
stock of education sector managers in the southern Africa region. 
4.3  Estimation of an Education and Skills Transition Matrix 
 
In order to gain a clearer picture of the implications of the AIDS pandemic for 
educational attainment and human capital accumulation, a simple education and skills 
transition matrix was estimated. For purposes of estimation, the population was divided 
into eight categories. An additional category allows for the possibility of death or 
permanent retirement from the labor force (category nine). The categories are as follows: 
 
1)  not working and not in school (children) 
2) enrolled  EP1 
3) enrolled  EP2 
4) enrolled  secondary  school 
5)  enrolled tertiary school and higher 
6) unskilled  labor 
7) skilled  labor 
8)  highly skilled labor 
9)  death or permanent retirement from the labor force. 
 
One can then postulate the following transition matrix T giving probabilities of moving 
from one category to the next from period t to period t+1. All blank elements in the 
matrix are assumed to have value zero.  
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 T 11   T12     T 16     T 19 
   T 22 T 23     T 26     T 29 
     T 33 T 34   T 36 T 37   T 39 
T=     T44 T 45   T 47   T 49 
      T 55   T 57 T 58 T 59 
       T 66     T 69 
        T 77   T 79 
         T 88 T 89 
           
 
The rows of the transition matrix T sum to one. This implies that the entire population in 
each category must be accounted for. Consider row 1. This corresponds to the category 
￿children who are not working and not in school￿ (for whatever reason) in period t. 
According to row 1, individuals in this group could remain not working and not in school 
(T11), enroll in primary school (T12), begin working as unskilled labor (T16), or die (T19). 
This group cannot leap to upper primary (EP2), secondary or tertiary school or join the 




Once the transition matrix has been estimated, the evolution of the workforce proceeds as 
follows. Assume that the period under consideration is one year. Therefore, Tij represents 
the probability of moving from category i to category j in one year. Also, for simplicity, 
the assumption that immigration is zero has been maintained. Therefore, the population 
only grows through births of children. Let Et be a nine element column vector with births 
in year t in the first element and zeros elsewhere. The number of individuals in each 
category in period t+1 is then  t t t E S T S + = + ’ 1 . 
 
The T matrix was estimated using data on enrollment from the Ministry of Education, on 
educational attainment of the population and births surviving to age one from the 1996 
census, and on the labor force from Ibraimo (2000) and national accounts. The estimation 
period was from 1996 to 1999. The census only supplies one year of data. Surviving 
births were assumed to be a constant share of the female population aged 15 to 49. Also, 
data on the labor force by skill category were only available for one year though 
estimates of the size of the overall labor force were available for each year in the 
estimation period from national accounts.  
 
Given the data holes and short time series, a minimum cross entropy approach, following 
Golan, Judge, and Miller (1996), was employed. The approach relies upon information 
                                                 
13 Note that the matrix assumes that, once an individual has entered the labor force in a particular labor 
category, that individual will stay in the same category until death or permanent retirement. There is no 
opportunity for skills upgrading (or downgrading). While inappropriate for other countries, this is probably 
a reasonable working assumption for Mozambique. It is certainly not a perfect description of current 
conditions￿anecdotal evidence of skills upgrading exists￿nor is it a fact of life. Encouraging skills 
upgrading is a potentially viable policy response to the AIDS pandemic and one that has not been 
considered here.   
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theory and is well-suited to problems where data series are short and/or incomplete. 
Estimates of the labor force by category were constrained to sum to the total labor force 
as estimated by national account. The minimum cross entropy approach also permits use 
of prior information on transition probabilities. Prior values for the transition probabilities 
were derived from education sector reports by Verde Azul (2000) and World Bank 
(2000) and from demographic data. The prior values employed and more details on the 
estimation procedure are presented in Appendix A. 
 
The estimated transition matrix is reported in Table 2. In interpreting the probabilities, it 
is useful to recall that these are annual probabilities. For example, EP2 (upper primary 
school) contains only two grade levels while EP1 (lower primary school) contains five. A 
passing student will finish and leave EP2 in two years whereas EP1 would take five. The 
longer duration of EP1 compared with EP2 explains much of the higher probability of 
remaining enrolled on an annual basis in EP1 compared with EP2 (T22 compared with 
T33).  
 
Since the effects of the AIDS pandemic were only beginning to be felt during the 
estimation period, the estimated transition matrix is presumed not to include the effects of 
HIV/AIDS. In developing the base AIDS scenario, AIDS is assumed to: 
 
a)  increase the death rate in each category, 
b)  increase the probability of transitioning from lower schooling levels (EP1 and 
EP2) to the unskilled work force, 
c)  reduce the probability of transitioning from secondary to tertiary schooling, 
d)  increase the probability of transitioning from tertiary education to the skilled labor 
category (as opposed to highly skilled) and  
e)  reduce the probabilities of staying in school at each scholastic level. 
 
Specifically, projected AIDS mortality rates by age class were mapped to the various 
educational and occupational categories. These AIDS death rates were simply added to 
the estimated death or permanent retirement rates shown in the last column of Table 1. 
Recall that the row probabilities must sum to one. For the labor categories, the AIDS 
death rates were subtracted from the probability of remaining in the labor force thus 
maintaining row balance.  
 
For educational categories other than tertiary, the increase in the death rate is next to zero 
since children enrolled at these levels are too old to be afflicted by MCT and too young to 
have developed AIDS from sexual contact.
14 However, due to the supply side constraints, 
massive orphaning and attendant social problems mentioned above, we expect the 
probability of remaining in school and the probability of transitioning to the next higher 
educational level to decline. These probabilities were reduced by a maximum of two 
percentage points as a function of the magnitude of the AIDS death rate for the adult 
population in that year relative to the maximum AIDS death rate for the adult population 
over the 1997-2010 period [Tij- .02*(AIDS death rate in t/maximum AIDS death rate)]. 
                                                 
14 This is true even for children who become sexually active and HIV positive at very early ages due to the 
nine year lag between infection and death.  
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Instead of transitioning to a higher level of schooling, these individuals were assumed to 
transition to the lower labor skill level. 
 
A higher proportion of students enrolled in tertiary education are also expected to leave 
school due to stresses induced by the AIDS pandemic. In addition, some tertiary level 
students will develop AIDS and be forced to drop out of school. To reflect this, the 
probability of remaining in school was reduced by an estimate of the AIDS death rate for 
the 20 to 24 year old age group and by the same function shown in the previous 
paragraph (maximum drop of 2 percentage points as a function of the adult AIDS death 
rate). To maintain row balance, the AIDS death rate was added to the ￿Exit￿ column and 
the functional drop of up to 2% was added to the probability of transitioning to the skilled 
labor force. 
 
A second AIDS scenario, labeled Education, is also developed. In this scenario, a strong 
policy effort to maintain enrollments and educational quality is assumed while the 
demographic effects of AIDS are assumed to remain in place. In this case, apart from 
AIDS deaths, children and university students are just as likely to remain in school and to 
transition to higher levels of schooling as before. In terms of the transition matrix, AIDS 
increases death rates and commensurately lowers the probability of remaining in category 
(Tii); however, other transition probabilities are unaffected. 
 
Results from the three analyses are shown for all three occupational categories and for 
upper primary school (EP2) enrollment. These results are presented in Figures 3, 4, 5, and 
6. The figures illustrate that, under the estimated transition probabilities and without 
AIDS, the labor force is projected to skills upgrade rather rapidly. The stock of highly 
skilled (tertiary educated) labor more than doubles and the stock of skilled labor expands 
by more than 50% in the no AIDS scenario by 2010. Rates of growth slow very 
considerably but are still positive for the two skilled labor categories in the Base AIDS 
scenario. Given the difference in productivity between the skilled labor categories and 
unskilled labor, this slow down in skilled and highly skilled labor stock accumulation is 
significant economically.  
 
The Education scenario illustrates the importance of maintaining access and quality in the 
educational system. If transition probabilities (other than death rates and the associated 
probability of staying in category) do not change, growth of the skilled and highly skilled 
labor stock is only mildly affected. The intuition behind this derives from the small size 
of the current highly skilled and skilled labor stocks relative to the number of potential 
new entrants currently engaged in the educational system. Maintaining the flow of new 
workers preserves most of the growth in the stock. Alternatively put, indirect impacts of 
AIDS on transition probabilities are, in this analysis, more important than the direct 




                                                 
15 This analysis glosses over important factors like worker experience. In the economic model presented in 
the next section, worker experience is rather crudely addressed through productivity effects. However, the 
experience profile of the workforce should be addressed in later work.  
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The evolution of primary school enrollment and the evolution of the unskilled labor force 
are essentially dual to one another. In the base AIDS scenario, large numbers of students 
quit schooling early in order to join the labor force. As a result, the unskilled labor force 
stock is actually larger in the Base AIDS scenario than in the hypothetical no AIDS 
scenario. Maintaining transition probabilities, as in the Education scenario, reduces the 
size of the unskilled labor stock in 2010 by 11% relative to the Base AIDS scenario. 
Given the importance of unskilled labor in value added, this difference in unskilled labor 
stocks is also economically important. 
 
The trends in unskilled labor stocks are inversely reflected in primary and secondary 
school enrollments. For example, consider EP2 enrollments as shown in Figure 6. In the 
Base AIDS scenario, enrollments actually decline due to the movement of students into 
the unskilled labor force. In the Education scenario, enrollments are maintained at a level 
quite close to the mythical no AIDS level reflecting again the primacy of transition 
probabilities in determining enrollments at the EP2 level and higher. 
 
As indicated above, these alternative labor stock accumulation scenarios will have 
economic impacts. The method for assessing these impacts is presented in the following 
section. 
5.  Economy-wide Modeling Approach 
5.1 Model  Structure 
 
The impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic is simulated using an economywide computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model of Mozambique.  CGE models have a number of 
features that make them suitable for examining ￿cross-cutting￿ issues such as the impact 
of AIDS.  
 
•  They simulate the functioning of a market economy, including markets for labor, 
capital, and commodities, and provide a useful perspective on how changes in 
economic conditions will likely be mediated through prices and markets.  
 
•  Because they can be fairly disaggregate, CGE models can provide an economic 
￿simulation laboratory￿ with which we can examine how different factors and 
channels of impact will affect the performance and structure of the economy, how 
they will interact, and which are (quantitatively) the most important.  
 
The disaggregation present in CGE models-- multiple sectors, households, and factors-- 
constitutes their primary advantage over more aggregated macroeconomic approaches. 
Aggregate macro models would miss (a) the sectoral interactions which have been shown 
to be important in previous work, (b) the implications of rural-urban migration, (c) the 
(large) differences in HIV prevalence among regions of Mozambique, and (d) the 
differences in HIV prevalence by skill and educational category.
16 The disaggregation 
                                                 
16 Disaggregation of macroeconomic models, such as in Cuddington, Hancock and Rogers (1994), is 
possible and enables the models to capture important compositional effects. Distinctions between the  
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present in CGE models permit them to capture compositional effects, a feature that has 
proved valuable in earlier analyses. For example, in an analysis of South Africa, Arndt 
and Lewis (2001) found that lackluster growth in investment sectors was a key reason for 
a counter-intuitive rise in the unemployment rate despite the concentration of AIDS 
deaths in labor classes with high unemployment rates.  
 
Experience with this class of models also highlights some disadvantages. An economy-
wide approach is not well suited for the analysis of all issues. In striving to develop a 
comprehensive picture of the entire economy, some detail is necessarily suppressed. If 
detail highly relevant to the analytical question at hand has been suppressed, the approach 
is obviously poorly suited. At the opposite extreme, some issues can be adequately 
addressed with economic frameworks that are less detailed allowing the analyst to spend 
more time on analysis and less time on data issues and modeling, and aggregated 
macroeconomic models have been employed for the analysis of the macroeconomic 
implications of HIV/AIDS.
17 Nevertheless, the cross-cutting nature and real economy 
impacts of HIV/AIDS indicate that compositional effects are likely to be important (as they 
were in South Africa. As a result, the CGE approach was adopted.  
 
CGE models, such as the Mozambique model, are frequently applied to issues of trade 
strategy, income distribution, and structural change in developing countries.
18 Economic 
decision-making is the outcome of decentralized optimizing by producers and consumers. 
A variety of substitution mechanisms are specified in these models, with substitution 
among labor types, between capital and labor, between imports and domestic goods, and 
between exports and domestic sales all occurring in response to variations in relative prices. 
Institutional rigidities and imperfect markets can be captured by the exogenous imposition 
of features such as immobile sectoral capital stocks, labor market segmentation, and a fixed 
exchange rate, which together limit a neoclassical interpretation of the models but permit 
their more realistic application to developing countries.  
 
The model version employed here contains 19 productive sectors; six primary factors of 
production (highly skilled, skilled, and unskilled non-agricultural labor; skilled and 
unskilled agricultural labor; and physical capital); and two household categories 
representing rural and urban households.
19 The basic model data is derived from a 1997 
Social Accounting Matrix estimated by the author. The SAM very closely reflects 
national accounts data. Additional work was performed to disaggregate labor by skill 
category and between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors.  
 
                                                                                                                                                
models then begin to fade. McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1999) present a fully merged CGE and macro 
modeling framework. 
17 Critics of CGE models would no doubt add to this list of disadvantages. 
18 The Mozambique model is a modified version of the IFPRI standard model (L￿fgren et al., 2001). A 
thorough exposition of the properties of this class of models can be found in Dervis, de Melo, and Robinson 
(1982). See Robinson (1989) for a review of CGE model applications to developing countries. 
19 The basic model data is derived from a 1997 Social Accounting Matrix estimated by the author. The 
SAM very closely reflects national accounts data. Additional work was performed to disaggregate labor by 
skill category and between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. While some regional production data 
has been gathered, the SAM is national.   
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On the supply side, sectoral production occurs according to a translog production function 
that determines how capital and labor inputs are combined together in generating value 
added. The value added aggregate is then combined with intermediate (material) inputs to 
produce output according to a fixed coefficients technology. Profit-maximization by 
producers is assumed, implying that each factor is demanded so that marginal revenue 
product equals marginal cost.  
 
On the demand side, the Mozambique model maintains the standard CGE assumption that 
domestic goods are imperfect substitutes for traded goods (both exports and imports). 
Sectoral exports are assumed different from output sold domestically, and are combined 
using a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function to form domestic output. This 
treatment captures explicit differences between exports and domestic goods (such as 
quality), as well as other barriers preventing costless reallocation of output between the 
export and domestic markets (such as market penetration costs). Hence, the price of the 
good on domestic markets need not equal the domestic price of exports, which is deter-
mined by the world price, the exchange rate, and exogenous export subsidies. Producers 
maximize revenue from selling to the two markets, so that the ratio of exports to domestic 
sales is a function of the price ratio.  
As with exports, sectoral imports and domestically produced goods are imperfect 
substitutes in both intermediate and final uses. Demanders of imports minimize the cost of 
acquiring a "composite" good, defined as a CES aggregation of imports and domestic 
demand.
20 Substitution elasticities can vary by sector, with lower elasticities reflecting 
greater differences between the domestic and imported good. Retaining the small country 
assumption, the supply of imports is assumed infinitely elastic at a price fixed by world 
market conditions. The domestic price of the imported good is determined by the world 
price times the exchange rate, plus any tariffs. The assumption of cost minimizing behavior 
by demanders implies that the sectoral desired ratio of imports to domestic goods is a 
function of their price ratio. 
Two household categories (rural and urban) are distinguished in the model, along with 
government and enterprise accounts. Each group receives income from rental of 
endowments (labor and capital) and has explicit behavioral rules governing savings and 
expenditure behavior. Specifically, factor income from endowments is distributed to the 
households using fixed shares, as are enterprise dividends. Households are taxed at a fixed 
rate, and may also receive transfers from the government; they save a fixed fraction of their 
income (which adds to the pool of domestic savings), with the remaining income spent on 
consumption. 
Firms receive the returns to capital, pay enterprise taxes, and receive transfers. The 
remainder is divided between enterprise savings and household dividends. The government 
receives tax revenue from import tariffs, indirect (excise) taxes, value added taxes, and 
income taxes on enterprises and households. The government also receives significant 
                                                 
20 This characterization of imperfect substitutability was developed by Armington (1969). It has since become 
a standard feature in numerous applied models; see, for example, Dervis, de Melo, and Robinson (1982) and 
Devarajan, Lewis, and Robinson (1990).  
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revenue in foreign aid. The government spends money on transfers (to households and 
firms), health, education, public administration and defense as well as government 
investment. The remaining surplus or deficit is added to the available supply of savings in 
the economy. 
Sectoral private consumption is determined through fixed expenditure shares under the 
assumption that households have a Cobb-Douglas utility function. Government 
consumption is also allocated using fixed expenditure shares. Final demand for 
intermediate goods is the sum of the intermediate demands generated in each producing 
sector. Investment is allocated using dynamic updating rules discussed in more detail 
below.  
Several other features affect simulations with the CGE model. The savings-investment 
￿closure￿ is savings-driven: in other words, the resources available for investment each 
year are determined by the sum of savings generated by groups within the economy 
(households, enterprises, and government) plus any net foreign capital inflow. The 
government deficit is fixed in nominal terms. Government spending thus varies with tax 
revenue. Net foreign savings are fixed exogenously, and the exchange rate varies to achieve 
external balance. In common with other CGE models, the model only determines relative 
prices and the absolute price level must be set exogenously. In our model, the aggregate 
producer price index is fixed, defining the numeraire. 
The features described up to now apply to a basic single-period ￿static￿ CGE model. But, 
because the HIV/AIDS story is inherently a dynamic one, the model must be capable of 
moving forward and looking at growth trajectories. So, the model must be ￿dynamized￿ by 
building in a set of accumulation and updating rules (e.g. investment adds to capital stock, 
after depreciation; labor force growth by skill category; productivity growth).  In addition, 
expectation formation must be specified.  
The latter point, expectations formation, represents a major distinguishing feature of many 
macroeconomic models. For the CGE model employed here, a simple set of adaptive 
expectations rules are employed. Adaptive expectations rules were chosen for two reasons. 
First, local analysts, particularly in the Ministry of Planning and Finance, viewed adaptive 
expectations as the most appropriate mechanism for the Mozambican context. Second, there 
are likely to be only small differences between a simple adaptive expectations formations 
approach and more complex rational expectations approaches (or even perfect foresight). 
Unlike sudden events, such as the Asian financial crisis, where forward-looking agents 
might be expected to behave very differently from agents who use solely the past as a guide, 
the AIDS pandemic will unfold very slowly. As a result, recent trends and/or current results 
will be reasonably good guides to economic performance in the near term. As a result, 
forward-looking and backward-looking behavior might not differ substantially. 
Having established expectations formation, a series of dynamic equations are also required 
to ￿update￿ various parameters and variables from one year to the next. For the most part, 
the relationships are straightforward. Growth in the total supply of each labor category is 
specified exogenously using the estimates obtained from the transition matrix described in 
the previous section. Migration of labor between rural and urban zones is permitted in  
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response to changes in wage differentials. Foreign capital inflows and domestic savings 
rates are allowed to adjust in response to the rate of return to capital. The stock of foreign 
owned capital is tracked throughout the simulation period. Each year, foreign investors are 
assumed to repatriate the full value of the return to foreign owned capital from the previous 
year. Sectoral capital stocks are adjusted each year based on investment, net of depreciation. 
The model adopts a ￿putty-clay￿ formulation whereby new investment can be directed to 
any sector in response to differential rates of return; however, installed equipment must 
remain in the same sector (e.g., a brewery cannot be converted into a railroad). Sectoral 
productivity growth is specified exogenously with the possibility of different rates of 
productivity growth by factor.  
Using these simple relationships to update key variables, we can generate a series of growth 
scenarios, based on different assumptions about demographics, transition probabilities, and 
other parameters. It is important to note that, at present, we are primarily interested in the 
differential impact across scenarios. From this vantage point, what matters most is whether 
our benchmark Base AIDS and No AIDS scenarios are more or less reasonable. It is not a 
forecast of economic outcomes. Instead, it is a base from which the differential impact of 
alternative options can be assessed.  
5.2 Key  Assumptions 
 
In the model, there are three major modes through which the HIV/AIDS pandemic affects 
economic growth. They are: 
 
1.  productivity growth effects, 
2.  population, labor and human capital accumulation effects, and 
3.  physical capital accumulation effects. 
 
These are treated in turn. 
 
1.  Productivity growth. There are good reasons to believe that productivity growth will 
slow considerably due to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Primary reasons include: 
 
•  an increased level of disruption of productive activities due to AIDS 
related morbidity and deaths at all levels of the workforce, 
•  disruption and reduced efficiency in the provision of key government 
services, 
•  a much younger, more inexperienced labor force with significantly less 
opportunity for mentoring/training on the job, 
•  a generalized decline in the health status of the population, even those not 
afflicted with the virus, as AIDS related care overwhelms the resources of 
the health care system,  
•  reduced incentives for investment in training due to curtailed life horizons, 
•  greater uncertainty associated with the formation of long-term contracting 
arrangements, and  
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•  the need to cope with the ramifications of the pandemic outside of the 
workplace, such as attending funerals and arranging for appropriate care 
for orphans and AIDS sufferers, that inevitably will detract from process 
improvement in the workplace. 
 
Papers documenting these expected productivity effects at the firm level have begun to 
appear in the literature. For example, Aventin and Huard (2000) find explicit cost 
increases at three manufacturing firms in C￿te d￿Ivoire with HIV prevalence rates of 10% 
to 15% amongst workers. Morris, Burdge, and Cheevers (2000) document significant 
costs associated with HIV/AIDS for a sugar mill in South Africa. Whiteside (2000) 
reviews a series of studies that document AIDS related costs to business across a variety 
of industries and afflicted countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank (1997) 
presents results of a business survey that addressed AIDS and worker turnover in selected 
African countries. These effects vary widely but none are positive. For example, the 
World Bank survey (conducted in 1994) found that, while high HIV prevalence rates are 
associated with higher rates of employee turnover, the increment to the turnover rate due 
to HIV/AIDS did not appear to be particularly large relative to average turnover.  
 
Simon et al. (2000) find evidence of cost-avoidance strategies-- such as reductions in 
benefits, more rigorous screening of job applicants in order to HIV prevalence among 
employees, production outsourcing, and increasing the capital intensity of production-- 
among large formal sector companies in Africa. That large firms are reacting indicates 
that AIDS has the attention of large company managers and that these managers believe 
that the costs of remaining in current business modes are unacceptable. The ability of 
firms, particularly large formal sector companies, to insulate themselves from the 
negative effects of the pandemic remains an open question. Generally, the most 
consistent numbers related to AIDS and firm productivity emerge from effects that are 
relatively easy to observe and document. These include absenteeism, health and life 
insurance rates, and AIDS deaths.  
 
Another effect that is relatively easily amenable to quantification is workforce 
experience. Elias (2000) considers AIDS impacts on the structure of the workforce in the 
mining sector of Botswana. In Botswana in 2000, the average age (mean and mode) of a 
mine-worker was 40 years with about 60% of workers falling in the 35 to 45 year age 
bracket. Only about 3% of mine workers in 2000 were under 24 years of age. Simulations 
by Elias (2000) indicate that, by 2015, about one third of miners will be under 24 and 
nearly 60% will be under 30 years of age. These are disturbing numbers if, as the 
microeconomic evidence suggests, worker experience and mentoring are important 
determinants of the level and rate of growth of productivity.
21 
 
At the aggregate level, health (using life expectancy as a proxy) has been found to be a 
significant contributor to growth in a number of studies. However, in these analyses, it is 
unclear whether the life expectancy variable is associated uniquely with health or with 
other determinants of growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995). Recent analyses by Bloom, 
                                                 
21 Bils and Klenow (1998) report a fairly strong positive association between experience and wages 
suggesting a positive relationship between experience and productivity.   
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Canning and Sevilla (2001) and Mayer (2001) have sought to isolate more rigorously the 
impact of health. Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla use cross-country panel data from 1960 to 
1990 (one observation on each country in the sample per decade) and stay with life 
expectancy as the proxy variable for health. They find that one year of increased life 
expectancy leads to a 4% increase in output. Mayer uses a cross-country panel for Latin 
America from 1950 to 1990 and proxies health using a probability of survival variable 
(by cohort). He finds a large and enduring impact of improved health on economic 
growth. Reversing the logic to declining health, these studies suggest that the negative 
productivity effects of HIV/AIDS might be quite large.
22   
 
While a number of indicators point to a potentially significant impact on productivity 
growth, the evidence remains indirect. Empirically well-grounded studies of the impacts 
of AIDS on rates of productivity growth do not yet exist. There are two primary reasons 
for this. First, measuring productivity growth by itself is strewn with pitfalls. Separating 
out the myriad direct and indirect effects of AIDS adds further complications. Second, 
even though the pandemic is now two decades old, the long lags between acquisition of 
the virus and diagnosis of AIDS leaves the empirical database rather thin. For example, a 
1997 study of firm impacts in Botswana, a country that currently has a mature and severe 
AIDS epidemic, found relatively few effects primarily because high HIV prevalence rates 
had not yet translated into a large number of AIDS cases (Greener, 1997). Due to these 
limitations, productivity effects are speculative. The particular assumptions follow.  
 
Since productivity growth rates are better understood in the ￿no AIDS￿ context, it is 
easier to start from those and work backwards. In the no AIDS scenario, technical change 
is assumed to be human capital using. This is consistent with the observation that, in 
many countries, wages of highly skilled people have stayed constant or increased in real 
terms despite dramatic increases in the stock of human capital.
23 Specifically, the 
productivity of highly skilled workers in the no AIDS scenario is assumed to grow at 4% 
per annum. Productivity of skilled and unskilled labor increases at 3% and 2% per annum 
respectively in both agriculture and non-agriculture. The productivity of capital is 
assumed to increase at 3% per annum.
24 This amounts to a total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth rate of about 2.7% (using 1997 value added shares). This rate is roughly 
consistent with the TFP growth rates estimated (but not reported) by Arndt, Robinson, 
and Tarp (forthcoming). 
 
                                                 
22 HIV/AIDS probably ruins life expectancy as a reasonable proxy variable for health. For example, in 
Mozambique, life expectancy in 2010 is expected to be about 14 years lower than it would have been in the 
absence of the pandemic. Few would expect output to be lower by 56% (56=4*14) based on the health 
effect alone. 
23 Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) provide a detailed analysis for the United States. Krugman (2000) 
provides a more general analysis. The upshot of these analyses is that factor-biased technical change 
provides the only consistent explanation for the maintenance/growth (depending on the country) of real 
returns to human capital over the past 50 years despite the rapid increase in supply of human capital. The 
CGE model employed for this analysis reproduces this effect. Without human capital using technical 
change, returns to human capital would fall to unacceptably low levels.   
24 These rates of growth maintain relative factor returns in acceptable ranges.  
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The effect of AIDS is to reduce productivity growth rates for all factors of production. 
Productivity growth for each factor is assumed to decline linearly with the share of the 
relevant adult population that has AIDS.
25 For agricultural labor, the sum of the central 
and northern populations is considered. For non-agricultural labor and capital, the 
southern population is considered. So, if one percent of the adult population in the South 
has AIDS in year t, TFP growth rates between year t and year t+1 are adjusted downward 
by one percentage point for all classes of non-agricultural labor and capital.  
 
2. Population, labor and human capital. Population forecasts are simply taken from 
Ministry of Health et al. (2001). Labor force projections are taken from the estimates 
derived from the transition matrices discussed in the previous section. A migration 
function, based on changes in rural and urban wages, divides the unskilled and skilled 
labor stocks between rural and urban zones. The elasticity of response to wage changes is 
assumed to be low at 0.2. Consistent with available demographic information, a low rate 
of migration from rural to urban zones is implicitly assumed at prevailing wage 
differentials. 
 
3. Physical capital accumulation. As indicated earlier, the model closure is savings 
driven. So, the pool of savings determines investment. In the 1997 SAM, foreign savings, 
comprised mainly of grants and soft loans, were the most important source of investment 
funds. Beyond this source, private capital inflows to fund a series of large investment 
projects, called the mega-projects, are expected to be very significant in the next decade. 
Unless specifically noted, mega-project investment is assumed to occur regardless of 
HIV/AIDS in all scenarios. Finally, recall that in all scenarios government expenditure is 
assumed to vary with revenue keeping the government deficit constant in nominal terms. 
Consequently, mega-project investment and government savings do not contribute to 
differentials across scenarios.  
 
Changes in foreign savings inflows (non-mega project) and domestic savings rates of 
enterprises and households contribute to differentials across scenarios. In the Base AIDS 
scenario, foreign savings inflows are assumed to remain constant at 1997 levels in real 
foreign currency terms. Also, urban and rural household savings rate are set at one 
percent of gross income while enterprise savings rates are set at 5.9% of gross income. 
These are approximately the rates observed in the 1997 SAM. In the no AIDS scenario, 
foreign savings inflows and household and enterprise savings rates are set as inelastic 
functions (elasticity of 0.5 for foreign savings and 0.25 for domestic savings rates) of 
changes in rates of return to capital. Rates of return to capital in year t higher than the 
base rate from 1997 generate higher foreign savings inflows and higher savings rates for 
households and enterprises in year t+1.
26  
 
                                                 
25 An approximating function that reduces productivity growth rates is required. The following function, 
[no AIDS rate ￿ (target adult population with AIDS)/(total target population)], is effective within the 
relevant range. The maximum subtraction factor does not exceed 0.015. 
26 The cross-country evidence indicates that domestic savings rates tend to respond only weakly to changes 
in the rate of return to capital (Schmidt-Hebbel, Serven, and Solimano, 1996).    
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A further word on the mega-projects is necessary. Forecasts of mega-project activity and 
structure were obtained from Andersson (2001). Andersson considers Mozal (including 
the planned expansion); hydroelectric investment at Cahora Bassa and Mepanda Uncua; 
the Temane and Pande natural gas projects; the Maputo Iron and Steel project; and the 
Corridor Sands titanium project. Should all of these projects materialize, they would 
result in very large investment capital inflows. These flows are shown in Table 2. 
 
Mega-projects are modeled by including a single mega-projects activity in the model. 
Investment capital comes entirely from foreign direct investment. Consistent with Mozal, 
imported capital goods comprise 96% of this investment expenditure. The technology 
employed by the mega-projects activity is also modeled on observations of Mozal. This 
technology is highly capital intensive with returns to capital comprising about 96% of 
total value added (Andersson, 2001). Labor value added accrues primarily to highly 
skilled and skilled labor. Intermediate input use is dominated by imported intermediates. 
The mega-projects activity produces entirely for the export market. Returns to capital are 
assumed to be repatriated. An activity tax equal to 1% of sales is imposed with the 
revenue accruing to government.
27  
 
Purchase of drug therapies represents another major potential flow of foreign exchange. 
The potential volume of this flow is easily illustrated. The HIV positive population in 
Mozambique is estimated at about 1.2 million in 2001. Drug therapy is available at a cost 
of about $500 per person per year. The cost of treating the entire HIV positive population 
in terms of drugs alone would thus be about $600 million per year. There is no way that 
Mozambique can afford this sum and little evidence that the international community is 
prepared to deliver additional aid at that level. Providing drug therapies only to 
individuals with AIDS (as opposed to simply HIV positive) would considerably shrink 
the pool of people eligible for drug therapies and commensurately reduce the costs, at 
least in the near term.  
 
Nevertheless, drug costs are not the only barrier to widespread use of drug therapies. 
Even if large volumes of drugs appeared tomorrow for free, the means for effectively 
distributing the drugs are, at the moment, practically non-existent. Effective distribution 
of drug therapies to even a relatively small percentage of the population would require 
massive investment in delivery infrastructure and years of effort on top of the drug costs. 
In light of these realities, drug therapies are ignored in the Base AIDS scenario. However, 
careful consideration of targeted drug treatment options is an important topic for future 
research.
28  
                                                 
27 The use of a single mega-project activity based on Mozal has the advantage of simplicity but fails to 
capture some relevant aspects of mega-project investment. In particular, the natural resource based mega-
projects offer the promise of significant revenue to government (well beyond 1% of sales) and hence a 
more significant impact on national income. However, since the mega-projects do not contribute to 
differentials across scenarios (except when the mega-projects are removed at which point the issue of 
taxation is dealt with explicitly), this simple approach was adopted. 
28 Some additional comments on drug therapies are worthwhile. The drug therapy issue presents brutal 
choices for the government of Mozambique. Since it cannot provide drug therapy to all who are in need, it 
must either provide no therapies or draw a line somewhere between those who receive and those who do 
not. The current policy is to make drug therapies available at cost at central hospitals. Once operational, the  
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5.3 Scenarios 
 
Four AIDS scenarios are presented labeled: Base AIDS, LessEffect, Education, and 
NoMega.
29  
•  Base AIDS. This scenario adopts the standard assumptions described above.  
•  LessEffect. This scenario provides some sensitivity analysis on some of the key 
assumptions that drive results in the Base AIDS scenario. In particular, the AIDS 
induced effects on productivity and transition probabilities in education and skills 
acquisition are halved. Also, in the LessEffect scenario, foreign savings inflows 
and domestic savings rates remain sensitive to rates of return on capital but with 
elasticity values set at half the levels of the no AIDS scenario.
30  
•  Education. This scenario takes nearly all inputs as in Base AIDS except the labor 
stock evolution, which is taken from the transition matrix Education scenario. In 
addition, to reflect the greater emphasis on education, donors are assumed to 
provide additional funding for education and the government of Mozambique is 
assumed to spend it for that purpose. This increment in education funding is 
assumed to amount to 25% and 50% of the base funding level over the first two 
years of the simulation period respectively, which amounts to about 1% of GDP. 
The amount then increases by 3% per year in real foreign currency terms for the 
remainder of the simulation period. Rules on domestic government resource 
allocation remain unchanged so the external funding for education is a pure 
increment (e.g., though the funds may be fungible, the government of 
Mozambique does not reallocate them).  
•  NoMega. This scenario is the same as Base AIDS except that no mega-project 
investment is assumed to occur.  
In addition to the four AIDS scenarios, a mythical no AIDS scenario is also run for 
purposes of comparison. Unless specifically noted (as in Education), policies across 
the scenarios are assumed to remain constant. For the reasons indicated earlier, a 
massive effort to deliver highly active anti-retroviral therapy (HAART) is considered 
impractical and is not modeled explicitly. 
 
                                                                                                                                                
policy will effectively make drugs available to the very small minority of Mozambicans who can afford 
them. In economic terms, this is likely to reduce death rates for workers with human capital. However, the 
analysis in section 4 indicates that the overwhelming determinant of the future stock of human capital is the 
growth rate, which the current policy is unlikely to influence. Targeted use of drug therapies might be a 
way to maintain supply and quality in the education system as assumed in the Education scenario. 
29 A scenario labeled TaxMega is also run with results presented in a footnote. TaxMega is the same as the 
base except that output taxes on the mega-project activity are increased from 1% to 5% of sales from the 
year 2000 onwards. 
30 In the LessEffect scenario, productivity growth effects are half as strong [no AIDS rate ￿ (target adult 
population with AIDS)/(total target population)/2]. In addition, the probability of transitioning to the next 
higher educational level was reduced by a maximum of one percentage point (as opposed to two in the base 
AIDS scenario) as a function of the magnitude of the AIDS death rate for the adult population in that year 
relative to the maximum AIDS death rate for the adult population over the 1997-2010 period  
[Tij- .01*(AIDS death rate in t/maximum AIDS death rate)]. Foreign savings inflows and domestic savings 
rates remain sensitive to rates of return on capital but with elasticity values set at half the levels of the no 
AIDS scenario  
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6. Results 
 
The economic impact of HIV/AIDS is potentially very large. Real GDP growth rates in 
the Base AIDS, LessEffect, and no AIDS scenarios are depicted in Figure 7. Growth rates 
are variable over the projection period in all scenarios due to the influence of mega-
project investment. For example, the largest volume of mega-project investment, nearly 
$1.5 billion dollars, is projected to occur in 2002 as shown in Table 2. This investment is 
assumed to ￿come online￿ (add to the available capital stock and hence productive 
capacity) in 2003. As a result of the additional mega-project production in 2003, the 
growth of GDP between 2002 and 2003 is very rapid.
31  
 
HIV/AIDS gradually reduces growth rates relative to the no AIDS scenario over the 
entire projection period. By 2010, the differences in growth rates relative to no AIDS are 
about 4.3% and 2.8% for the Base AIDS and LessEffect scenarios respectively. Relative 
to the findings of earlier analyses, these are large differences in growth rates. For 
example, Arndt and Lewis (2000) find for South Africa a maximum difference between 
their AIDS and no AIDS scenarios of 2.6%.  
 
The large gap in Mozambican real GDP growth rates for 2010 is attributable to the 
interacting effects of reduced rates of human and physical capital accumulation combined 
with factor-specific rates of technical change that are biased towards human and physical 
capital. Table 4 illustrates the shifts in economic structure that underlie these interactions. 
The Table illustrates the initial structure of GDP at factor cost by sector and the factor 
intensities by sector. In addition, the Table shows the ratios of real value added by sector 
between the Base AIDS and no AIDS scenarios in 2010. These ratios indicate that, while 
all sectors are smaller in the Base AIDS scenario compared with the no AIDS scenario, 
the economic impacts of HIV/AIDS differ strongly by sector.  
 
Sectors that provide investment goods, such as construction and other manufactures, are 
particularly hard hit. But, relative factor intensities also play a role. For example, there 
are, by 2010, one third fewer highly skilled workers in Base AIDS compared with no 
AIDS scenarios while the stock of unskilled workers is roughly the same between the two 
scenarios (see figures 3 and 5). As one would expect given these changes in relative 
factor supplies, correlation analyses (both simple and weighted by initial sectoral shares 
in GDP at factor cost) indicate that sectors that use highly skilled labor intensively tend to 
be more strongly impacted by the AIDS pandemic. The same is true of skilled labor and 
capital. On the other hand, sectors that use unskilled labor intensively, such as the 
agricultural sectors, tend to be less strongly affected.  
 
The results indicate a compositional shift in output in Base AIDS relative to No AIDS 
towards sectors that intensively use factors with low productivity growth rates (unskilled 
labor) and away from sectors that intensively use factors with high productivity growth 
                                                 
31 The actual timing of mega-project investment and the timing of productive capacity ￿coming online￿ is 
highly unlikely to unfold as projected. For a number of purposes, these timing issues are crucial. However, 
since we are primarily interested in the differential effects of HIV/AIDS across scenarios, the nuances of 
mega-project timing are not particularly important.   
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rates (skilled labor, highly skilled labor, and capital). Over time, these differences in 
economic structure become more profound and growth rates diverge. In earlier studies, in 
contrast, technical progress is typically assumed to be Hicks-neutral. As a result, these 
interactions, and their effects on growth, were not captured.
32 Indeed, if the assumption of 
Hick-neutral technical progress is imposed (at the average rate implied by the biased, 
factor-specific technical change rates weighted by 1997 factor shares) on the Base AIDS 
and No AIDS scenarios, the maximum differential in the real GDP growth rate shrinks to 
only 2.5%. 
 
The differences in growth rates shown in Figure 7 cumulate into large differences in 
GDP. By 2010, the economy is between 14% (LessEffect) and 20% (Base AIDS) smaller 
compared to the no AIDS scenario. On a per capita GDP basis, the effect of AIDS is 
considerably less pronounced due to differentials in population growth (the population is 
projected to be 10% smaller). Per capita GDP in 2010 is between 4% (LessEffect) and 
12% (Base AIDS) lower compared with the no AIDS scenario. Commensurately, per 
capita GDP growth rates are between 0.3% (LessEffect) and 1.0% (Base AIDS) lower. 
 
The major impacts on GDP can be roughly decomposed into their component parts. This 
is done for the Base AIDS scenario and is shown in Figure 8. All of the effects are 
important. The most important, according to the decomposition, is the productivity effect. 
At least three caveats apply to the decomposition. The first is technical. Since these 
effects interact, the order of simulation matters in determining the magnitude of each 
effect. Sensitivity analysis on the ordering of simulations reveals differences in 
magnitudes but a qualitatively similar story. The second caveat also relates to 
interactions. Since educated people will be the primary generators and adaptors of 
improved technology, the decomposition of human capital and technology effects, though 
possible in the model as currently specified, is somewhat artificial.  
 
The final caveat applies to implications beyond 2010 (e.g., beyond the simulation period). 
As illustrated in Figure 6, HIV/AIDS might substantially reduce the number of children 
enrolled in school. If it does this, growth prospects will be harmed well beyond the 2010 
time horizon employed in this paper. Even if a viable and inexpensive AIDS vaccine 
materialized towards the end of the decade, economic effects emanating from reduced 
school enrollments would continue for at least another decade. 
 
This final point is worth bearing in mind when one compares the Education scenario with 
the Base AIDS scenario. As illustrated in Figure 9, the Education and Base AIDS 
scenarios are nearly indistinguishable in terms of GDP. However, they are quite different 
                                                 
32 It should be noted that a single sector macroeconomic model with multiple factors of production, biased 
technical change, and differential rates of accumulation of factors could also be expected to capture the 
interactions between biased technical change and differential rates of factor accumulation. However, the 
elasticities of substitution between factors for the aggregate production function in the model would be 
forced to do a considerable amount of work. They would have to capture the apparent substitution effect 
from shifts in the composition of output along with the underlying flexibility of production technologies 
(presumably an average on a value added share basis of the sectoral elasticity values). Compositional shifts 
in the structure of output can have significant effects on the apparent aggregate substitution elasticity. See, 
for example, Hertel, Stiegert, and Vroomen (1996).  
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in terms of output per worker. As can be deduced from Figures 3, 4, and 5, the labor force 
in 2010 is considerably smaller in the Education scenario compared with the Base AIDS 
scenario. The smaller labor force reflects the much larger number of young people 
enrolled in school. However, output per worker is 11% higher. This is due to greater 
stocks of human capital (as shown in the figures) and a larger endowment of capital per 
worker (10% higher). 
 
The Education and Base AIDS scenarios also differ considerably in wages. For example, 
by 2010, the wage for unskilled agricultural labor in the Education scenario is 14% 
higher than the wage in the Base AIDS scenario. This wage difference more than offsets 
the quantity difference so that the share of unskilled agricultural labor in nominal GDP at 
factor cost is actually higher in the Education scenario than in the Base AIDS scenario. 
This is an interesting result. It indicates that the benefits from exiting school early and 
joining the labor force are likely to be at least partially offset by declines in the unskilled 
wage.  
 
While the level of GDP between the Education and Base AIDS scenarios looks very 
similar on a graphical scale, there are in fact interesting differentials in growth rates 
between the two scenarios. This is shown in Figure 10. Growth rates in the Education 
scenario are actually slightly lower compared with Base AIDS in the early portion of the 
simulation period due to the GDP contributions of children who are working (counted in 
GDP) rather than attending school (not counted in GDP). However, relative to Base 
AIDS, growth rates in the Education scenario gradually increase. By 2010, the real GDP 
growth rate is about 0.6 percentage points higher in Education compared to Base AIDS. 
This reflects the benefits of more rapid accumulation of human capital. In addition, in the 
Education scenario, the load of potential human capital enrolled in the school system is 
much higher making growth prospects much brighter in the subsequent decade and 
beyond. 
 
Turning to the mega-projects, the results indicate, as expected, that the mega-projects will 
have an important impact on GDP (as well as a host of other macroeconomic variables). 
Over the period 2000 to 2010, realization of all of the mega projects listed in Table 2 
increases annual average GDP growth by about 1.3%. By 2010, the level of real GDP is 
16% higher compared with the NoMega scenario. Unfortunately, the mega-projects 
contain very few links to the domestic economy. Despite the large differences in GDP, 
the impact on national income and national welfare is very small when tax rates on mega-
projects are low. For example, the sum of real household consumption and recurrent 
government spending is less than 1% larger in the Base AIDS scenario compared with the 
NoMega scenario. Consequently, unless the tax take from mega-projects increases 
dramatically, they provide almost no counter-balance to the economic impacts of 
HIV/AIDS.
 33 
                                                 
33 Given the current understanding of the likely production structure of the mega-projects, the only real link 
to the domestic economy is through taxation and/or royalties. Real opportunities exist here that should be 
capitalized upon. For example, assuming all additional government revenue is spent, a five percent output 
tax on the mega-projects allows the level of real government expenditure to expand to 21% above the level 
of the Base AIDS scenario by 2010 (recall that the Base AIDS scenario assumes an output tax of 1%).  




The major findings of this report can be compactly summarized.  
 
•  The HIV/AIDS pandemic could have large economic impacts. Comparing two 
alternative AIDS scenarios with a fictional no AIDS scenario to the year 2010, 
GDP growth rates diverge substantially over the period reaching a gap of between 
2.8% and 4.3% per annum in 2010. Due to these growth differentials, the 
economy is between 14% and 20% smaller in 2010 relative to the no AIDS 
scenario. Differences in population growth rates mute the differences in per capita 
GDP growth rates. Over the projection period, cumulative per capita GDP growth 
rates are between 0.3% and 1.0% lower. 
 
•  The major sources of this slowdown in growth are (1) reduced productivity 
growth, (2) reduced population growth and human capital accumulation, and (3) 
reduced physical capital accumulation. All three of these effects are significant, 
but the productivity effect is the most important. 
 
•  Impacts on school enrollments are potentially very large with implications for 
growth rates in the latter part of this decade and beyond. If pandemic related 
problems on the supply and demand side of the education sector result in a 
reduced probability of staying in school, growth in school enrollments and human 
capital stocks is strongly muted. Conversely, if policy actions maintain current 
transition probabilities, the rate of GDP growth by 2010 is 0.6% faster than in the 
Base AIDS scenario. 
 
•  Due to the long time lags between infection and onset of AIDS, the AIDS case 
projections that drive these results are, barring rapid advance in medical 
technologies, essentially programmed into the system through the duration of the 
simulation period (out to 2010). Successful actions to prevent the spread of HIV 
today will bear fruit in terms of reduced numbers of AIDS cases and AIDS deaths 
in approximately eight years.  
 
As emphasized in the introduction, a high degree of uncertainty must be associated with 
these results. Nevertheless, with respect to the AIDS pandemic, three general policy 
conclusions emerge from this analysis. 
 
                                                                                                                                                
Given the extractive nature of most planned mega-projects, the government can probably claim a much 
larger share of revenues. Overall, the results indicate that the GDP contribution of the mega-projects is an 
extremely misleading indicator of impact on national welfare. The real indicator is tax take, which should 
be negotiated aggressively especially in extractive industries. Then, the mega-projects offer potential to 
contribute to economic development and the fight against AIDS. 
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•  Aggressive actions to limit the scope, duration, and economic impacts of the 
AIDS pandemic should be undertaken. 
 
•  Maintaining school enrollment rates, graduation rates, and quality, along with 
other efforts to maintain or increase the stock of human capital, should figure 
prominently among these actions.  
 
•  Macroeconomic planners should reduce their expected growth rates. Very rapid 
growth rates (e.g., eight percent per year) are unlikely to be realized. 
 
The following section considers policy implications in more detail. 
 
8. Policy  Implications 
 
The preceding analysis has focused on implications of the HIV/AIDS pandemic given 
observations on HIV prevalence rates in 2000 and demographic projections of the 
implications of these prevalence rates through 2010. More detailed policy implications 
are now drawn from the analysis. Given the time lags inherent in the pandemic, policy 
actions can be divided into two categories: a) reactive policies to face the ramifications of 
the pandemic in the current decade and b) preventive policies designed to reduce 
HIV/AIDS prevalence in future decades. The period under consideration pertains to the 
period where reactive policies are relevant. However, the basic results can also be used to 
consider the implications of preventive policies. Both categories of policy responses are 
considered below. A summary of policy implications derived from this section and earlier 
sections is presented in Table 5. 
 
Before proceeding, a further word on medical technology, in the context of policy 
responses, is worthwhile. In the Introduction to this document, the assumption of 
relatively constant medical technology was adopted. Nevertheless, over time, the 
likelihood increases that a vaccine (or similar technology in terms of outcome) will 
emerge. Unfortunately, the answer to the crucial question of when a useable vaccine 
might emerge is not known. As of this writing, a number of potential technologies are at 
various stages of development. While available tests indicate promise and some 
technologies are proceeding to human trials (a fairly advanced stage of testing), an AIDS 
vaccine is not currently available and one may not come available for a considerable 
period of time (see, for example, www.iavi.org).  
 
Under these circumstances, the prudent operational assumption, at least looking out over 
the remainder of the decade, is the one that has been maintained so far￿medical 
technologies will not thwart the pandemic prior to 2010. So, the prospect of medical 
advances should not influence consideration of reactive policies designed to blunt the 
negative impacts of the pandemic over the coming decade. This is particularly true in 
light of the general consistency between the most promising reactive policies and overall 
development objectives as will be made clear below.   
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Over the longer term (the next decade and beyond), prospects for effective medical 
technologies brighten considerably. Some combination of improved medical technology, 
behavior modification (catalyzed through AIDS awareness/education programs or simple 
observation), and pure Darwinism is quite likely to eventually bring down HIV/AIDS 
prevalence rates to relatively low levels. Adopting the view of the AIDS crisis as severe 
and long-lasting but nevertheless finite has important implications for policy. Under this 
view, policy seeks to limit the impact and shorten the duration of the pandemic.
34 Once 
the brunt of the pandemic has passed, the policies can then, in principle, be discontinued. 
 
8.1  Reactive policy responses 
 
Under the broad category of reactive responses, education policy was considered 
explicitly in the scenario Education. In the Base AIDS scenario, deaths of teachers and 
widespread orphaning is assumed to reduce the probability of staying school and of 
transitioning to higher grade levels. In the Education scenario, (donor financed) 
budgetary increases are assumed to permit the education sector to maintain these 
probabilities at current (relatively low) levels. As a result, school enrollments and human 
capital stocks are projected to rise. Given a successful program to maintain or increase 
school enrollments, fewer children and young adults are working, which, by itself, 
reduces GDP. However, the GDP effects of a smaller workforce are largely offset by 
human capital accumulation and improved physical capital to worker ratios. By the end 
of the simulation period (2010), GDP growth rates in the Education scenario exceed GDP 
growth rates by 0.6% reflecting the higher productivity of more a skilled workforce. 
Finally, holding children in school supports the unskilled wage during the simulation 
period. In the Education scenario, the rise in the wage more than offsets the decline in 
unskilled labor supply leaving total payments to unskilled labor slightly higher than in the 
Base AIDS scenario. 
 
Some additional ￿back of the envelope￿ calculations permit one to assess the benefits of a 
0.6% increment to growth beyond 2010. Some additional assumptions are necessary. In 
particular, the Education and Base scenarios are assumed to lead to the same level of 
GDP in 2010 (essentially consistent with the model result), but the Education scenario 
yields a GDP growth rate of 4.6% over the period 2010 to 2020 compared with 4.0% in 
the base. These growth rates are consistent with the results obtained in the modeling for 
the year 2010. The growth rate increment of 0.6% in the Education scenario reflects 
differentials in the stocks of economically active human capital (workers) and the growth 
rate of that stock (which depends primarily upon the number of students enrolled in 
school).
35 From 2021 to 2040 (the terminal year), growth rates are constant at 4.0% 
between the two scenarios. But, since the Education scenario has a higher level of GDP 
                                                 
34 Taking the alternative view, a total inability to modify behavior or treat the disease resulting in high 
AIDS death rates in perpetuity, could have radically different policy implications. For example, the 
economically optimal rate of investment in human capital would decline since the expected lifespan of 
educated people would be considerably reduced. 
35 This increment to growth is thus primarily dependent on the success of education policies in the current 
decade and largely independent of the success of prevention programs or medical technologies in reducing 
AIDS deaths in the next decade.  
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in 2021, differences in GDP between the scenarios persist to the terminal year. Using a 
discount rate of 10%, net present value calculations yield willingness to invest figures of 
up to 5.3% of GDP in incremental education expenditures each year over the period 2002 
to 2010 in order to obtain the 0.6% increment to GDP growth over the 2010 to 2020 
period (see Appendix C for more details).  
 
The point of this exercise is not necessarily that resources to the education sector should 
be massively increased since absorptive capacity is an issue. Rather, the point is that 
initiatives that successfully maintain or increase enrollments and quality in the 
educational system are likely to have a high payoff. Given the extent of the payoff, 
imaginative education initiatives, even costly ones, can be considered. Reducing the 
perceived costs of sending children to school, by waiving textbook fees for example, is 
one fairly obvious (but potentially effective) avenue for attempting to blunt the demand 
side effect. In the 1997 national household survey, monetary costs were cited frequently 
by rural households as a primary reason for not sending children to school (Handa, Omar, 
and Ibraimo 1998).  
 
More imaginatively, opportunity costs of sending children to school could also be 
addressed. For example, in order to encourage AIDS afflicted families to continue 
sending children to school, a food (or cash) for education program might be considered. 
These programs provide an allotment of grain (cash) to families of targeted students 
provided those students attend school. A recent evaluation of a food for education 
program in Bangladesh found the program to be ￿highly successful in increasing primary 
school enrollment, promoting school attendance, and reducing dropout rates￿ with the 
enrollment rate increase being larger for girls than for boys (Ahmed and del Ninno, 
2002).  
 
Stoking demand for education is unlikely to be effective if concerns on the supply side 
are not addressed. Eliminating impediments to hiring teachers from abroad could help 
ease supply constraints. However, tapping international labor markets for teachers is 
likely to be a more viable strategy for English-speaking countries like Zambia than for 
Mozambique.
36 A more aggressive option would be to target teachers as recipients of 
anti-retroviral drug therapy at reduced prices.
37 
 
The costs of the education policies mentioned above are considerable. The cost of the 
Bangladeshi food for education program is about USD 0.10 per beneficiary per day. So, 
assuming the same cost level, 200 days in school per year, and one to two million 
children targeted (from nearly half to nearly all children enrolled in primary school), the 
total cost would be about USD 20-40 million per year. Regarding drug treatment for 
teachers, there are about 50,000 teachers. If about 10,000 of them (20%) are HIV positive 
and drugs (purchase plus distribution) cost USD 750 per person per year, the cost of the 
                                                 
36 For critical administrative positions on the other hand, tapping international labor markets (including 
technical assistance) is likely to be a viable choice. 
37 As indicated earlier, drug therapies present difficult policy choices.  
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program would be about USD 7.5 million per year assuming all HIV positive teachers are 
treated and 100% of drug and delivery costs are borne by the state.
38  
 
These costs add up to about the 1% of GDP (actual cost depends on the implementation 
strategy) assumed in the Education scenario. To gain further perspective on cost, the total 
government allocation to education in 2000 amounted to about USD 125 million or about 
3% of GDP. On the other hand, the benefits of maintaining or increasing enrollments and 
educational quality dwarf even these costs assuming the programs are effective. In order 
to satisfy this last caveat, considerable care will have to be taken to design programs that 
will function in the Mozambican context. 
 
A second major implication arises implicitly from the analysis. The time to implement 
policy reforms is now. The delays between infection and onset of AIDS provide a 
window of opportunity for implementing policies while AIDS deaths rates are relatively 
low. This message applies to general economic policy reform measures, not just those 
focused specifically at the AIDS pandemic.  
 
There are two primary reasons for moving to rapid as opposed to gradual implementation 
of policy reform measures. First, major policy reform measures typically impose 
adjustment costs. Minimization of these adjustment costs is the primary rationale for a 
gradual implementation strategy. However, since adjustment costs generally cannot be 
eliminated, a gradual approach implies bearing adjustment costs with a worsening 
pandemic as well as a delay in reaping the benefits of the reform. Conversely, if policy 
reform is implemented rapidly, a large share of the adjustment costs are likely to be 
incurred prior to the years where large numbers of AIDS deaths are projected and the 
benefit stream will help counter the negative impacts in these years.  
 
In addition, the primary counter argument to a gradual policy implementation strategy is 
sharpened in the context of AIDS. In particular, a gradual policy implementation strategy 
too often leads to failure to fully implement the envisioned policy change. In the context 
of AIDS, the risks of implementation failure are heightened as policy attention is highly 
likely to focus increasingly on the direct effects of the pandemic distracting attention 
from implementation of general economic policy measures that could help to offset the 
economic impacts of the pandemic.  
 
Second, due to AIDS deaths within government, capacity to implement policy change is 
likely to be affected. The presumption of increased administrative capacity over time 
might have to be scaled back or reconsidered entirely over the next decade or so. The best 
chance for effective implementation might be the near term rather than in the future. 
Along these same lines, AIDS strongly reinforces arguments for simplified administrative 
and regulatory structures, which marshal scarce government capacity in core functions. 
 
                                                 
38 Less costly options are obviously available. Fewer children could be targeted in the food for education 
program, and drugs could be distributed only to teachers who have exhibited symptoms of AIDS and 
recipients could be asked to contribute to the cost of treatment.  
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More generally, the preceding analysis has shown that the economic impacts of AIDS are 
likely to occur through channels that are well known to students of development. The 
major links relate to human capital, productivity, and savings/investment. These channels 
have been and remain the subject of considerable thought and policy dialogue. 
Exhortation to ￿do better￿ because of AIDS is not likely to be helpful. The two major 
policy implications highlighted above-- provide additional resources to education and 
move quickly to implement the existing policy reform agenda-- arise primarily from a re-
weighting of priorities in light of the pandemic. At the same time, the two basic policy 
thrusts discussed above would deserve serious consideration even in the absence of the 
pandemic. Given the uncertainty associated with the pandemic in general and economic 
impacts in particular, focus on policies that simultaneously address major economic 
implications of AIDS and major development constraints should be preferred.  
 
Another example might help to make the point. More aggressive extension of labor-
saving agricultural technology potentially constitutes a third thrust that counters 
implications of the pandemic and addresses major development constraints. On the latter, 
evidence is abundant that labor availability and low labor productivity limit agricultural 
output (Arndt and Tarp, forthcoming). The AIDS pandemic will not help. In light of 
AIDS, technologies that are labor saving, such as animal traction and herbicide, become 
even more attractive. Nevertheless, the desirability of efforts to more aggressively push 
labor saving technologies should be considered within the broader context of limited 
resources and administrative capacity. 
 
8.2  Preventive policy responses 
 
The human costs of the pandemic alone provide compelling reason to consider aggressive 
strategies to reduce HIV prevalence. The economic analysis presented above indicates 
that considerable economic benefit can be reaped from successful efforts to reduce HIV 
prevalence. As mentioned earlier, efforts to reduce HIV prevalence rates are long-term 
investments. Averting infection today implies one fewer AIDS case in approximately 
eight years.
39 Since economic costs essentially begin with the onset of AIDS, the 
economic benefits of an averted infection begin nearly a decade later.  
 
While nobody claims to possess the ideal measure for assessing the ￿optimal￿ level of 
resource allocation to preventive policy, there is considerable debate over which of the 
highly imperfect but available measures to use. Hans Binswanger (2000) argues for use 
of loss of GDP. This would justify a massive preventive policy response since almost 
everyone believes that the total GDP costs HIV/AIDS are large and negative. Per capita 
GDP is another metric for gauging benefits and costs. If population is the same in the 
policy intervention and base scenarios (as presumed in the previous analysis of education 
policy), then the per capita and total GDP measures boil down to the same thing. This is 
                                                 
39 The exact delay continues to be debated. A shorter period between infection and death increases the 
economic benefits of preventive policies since the benefits are realized earlier. In addition, the duration of 
the period between infection and death varies across individuals implying that effective prevention would 
impact AIDS deaths earlier than the averages imply.  
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obviously not the case with respect to policies designed to limit the spread of HIV. Since, 
essentially by definition, successful preventive policies increase population, the economic 
gains are spread across more individuals. As indicated in the analysis, per capita GDP 
impacts of AIDS are considerably smaller than the overall GDP impact. Per capita GDP 
is thus by far the most conservative measure in terms of magnitude of preventive 
expenditure outlays. 
 
Nevertheless, even the lower end estimate for per capita GDP impacts (a 0.3% growth 
differential) justifies an active AIDS prevention policy. Like in the case of education, the 
benefits from an AIDS prevention policy will be realized primarily in the next decade. 
Consequently, some additional assumptions are required. In particular, an active AIDS 
prevention policy is assumed to be implemented in 2002. This policy is maintained at a 
cost amounting to a constant fraction of GDP through 2007 and then is phased out 
linearly over the next three years. Despite the preventive policies, GDP and population 
are assumed to be the same in 2010 due to the effect of time lags. From 2011 to 2020, 
GDP per capita grows at a 0.3% per annum increment for the case of an effective 
preventive policy, corresponding to the lower end of the range of estimated per capita 
GDP effects. The discount rate is 10% as before. Even under the restrictive assumption 
that only per capita GDP matters, spending on prevention at a level of up to 2.5% of GDP 




This estimate implicitly assumes roughly constant medical technology, which is quite 
pessimistic. If, on the other hand, one is willing to optimistically assume that a cheap and 
effective vaccine will emerge by the end of this decade and that a major international 
effort will be launched to widely distribute this vaccine once developed, then the level of 
effort that should be allocated to preventive policy diminishes considerably since, for 
most of the infections averted, the vaccine would (by assumption) prevent the 
progression on to AIDS.
41  
 
Prudence, however, dictates an active prevention program. As with education policy, the 
limiting factor is probably the ability to design and implement effective preventive 
policies rather than the overall budget. Nevertheless, a resource envelope large enough to 
contain costly initiatives appears to be justified as long as, of course, these initiatives are 
effective in controlling the spread of HIV. 
 
Much has been written on prevention policy that does not bear repeating here. However, 
at least two themes can be identified (Ainsworth and Teokul, 2000). First, broad based 
AIDS awareness programs should focus on the young. This is a large group. The cohort 
under 20 (15) represents 55%  (45%) of the population. Also, since they have not been 
                                                 
40 As in the evaluation of the Education scenario, this calculation assumes no tendency for convergence in 
GDP. Assuming convergence over the 2020 to 2040 period reduces the maximum justified preventive 
expenditure level to about 1.9% of GDP, which leaves qualitative conclusions intact. 
41 The average length and the variance of the period between infection and death is a particularly critical 
parameter here. The shorter the average period and the higher the variance (assuming the distribution is 
symmetric) the more people who will become infected and die prior to a vaccine coming available and, 
concomitantly, the stronger the rationale for a prevention program.  
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sexually active for as long a period of time, young people are less likely to be HIV 
positive. This shows up clearly in the data. As indicated earlier, estimated prevalence 
rates for children ages 5-14 are nearly zero. For the age groups 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, and 
30-34 in the year 2000, prevalence rates are estimated at 4.7, 10.9, 15.5, and 18.4 percent 
respectively. The rates thereafter decline with age.  
 
In addition, young people are widely thought to be more malleable and thus more easily 
influenced by AIDS awareness programs because their behavior patterns are not as well 
established. Uganda is an example where delay of first sexual experience and other 
behavioral modifications are thought to have significantly reduced the spread of the 
pandemic (UNAIDS, 2001).
  Finally, the mounting evidence that educated people are 
taking steps to reduce their probability of becoming infected indicates that the reactive 
education policies outlined above might also serve as preventive policies. 
 
Second, high-risk populations are another target group for behavior modification. For 
example, behavior modification in commercial sex, such as insistence on the use of a 
condom, has the potential to significantly slow the spread of the disease even in a 
generalized pandemic like in Mozambique. Safer commercial sex is widely credited for 
the success of Thailand in curbing the growth of the pandemic (Ainsworth and Teokul, 
2000).  
  
To wrap up, the economic analysis and related policy implications provide strong support 
for adoption of both reactive and preventive policies. While the pandemic cannot be 
avoided, much can be done to reduce its harshness and duration. Some relatively broad 
policy options were also presented; however, as usual, the devils are in the details.  
Moving beyond these general policy ideas (both reactive and preventive) to real policy 
initiatives will require careful thought particularly with respect to issues of 
implementation.   
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Table 3: Value and timing of mega-project investment in USD millions. 
 
 














2001 150 250 100 500
2002 600 350 200 300 1450
2003 150 190 600 100 1040
2004 200 50 250
2005 300 50 350
2006 400 50 450
2007 600 300 50 950
2008 400 400 50 850
2009 300 300 50 650 
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Table 4: Economic structure and relative performance by sector. 
 
Notes:  
Column 1 contains the productive sectors (excluding big projects, which did not contribute to GDP in 1997 and 
had a real value added ratio of one between the Base AIDS and No AIDS scenarios in 2010). Abbreviated 
sector names are Beverages and Tobacco, Primary Products Processing, Transport and Communication, 
Insurance and Finance, Public Administration and Defense, and Labor Intensive Services.  
Column 2 shows the ratio of real value added for the Base AIDS relative to the No AIDS scenario by sector in 
2010.  
Columns 3-6 show the contribution of each factor to sectoral in value added in 1997. Agricultural and non-
agricultural labor categories are aggregated for both the unskilled and skilled labor classes. 
Column 7 shows the contribution of each sector to real GDP at factor cost. 
Correlations are between the real value added ratio in 2010 and the factor contributions by sector. 
Weighted averages and correlations are developed using the sectoral shares in real GDP at factor cost (column 
7) as weights. The weighted correlations are maximum likelihood estimates (no degrees of freedom correction 
in variance and covariance estimates). 




(2010) Unskilled Skilled Highly Capital
of  VA in 
GDPfc 
(1997)
Crops 0.85 0.74 0.08 0.00 0.18 0.27
Livestock 0.84 0.74 0.08 0.00 0.18 0.02
Forestry 0.83 0.70 0.07 0.00 0.23 0.03
Extraction 0.77 0.14 0.20 0.11 0.54 0.04
Food Proc. 0.84 0.34 0.22 0.12 0.32 0.03
Bev./Tobacco 0.82 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.81 0.01
Prim. Prod. Proc. 0.77 0.21 0.25 0.14 0.40 0.02
Chemicals 0.75 0.08 0.15 0.08 0.70 0.01
Other Manuf 0.58 0.17 0.29 0.16 0.37 0.01
Other Services 0.80 0.41 0.26 0.14 0.19 0.08
Construction 0.52 0.12 0.19 0.11 0.58 0.07
Commerce 0.78 0.29 0.21 0.12 0.38 0.20
Trans./Comm. 0.77 0.21 0.26 0.14 0.38 0.09
Ins./Finance 0.72 0.11 0.23 0.13 0.54 0.05
P. Admin./Defense 0.73 0.21 0.50 0.28 0.00 0.03
Education 0.74 0.20 0.45 0.25 0.11 0.02
Health 0.74 0.22 0.50 0.28 0.00 0.00
Lab. Int. Serv. 0.87 0.21 0.51 0.28 0.00 0.02
Average 0.76 0.29 0.25 0.13 0.33
Correlation 0.51 -0.17 -0.22 -0.28
Weighted Avg. 0.78 0.40 0.19 0.09 0.31
Weighted Corr. 0.68 -0.36 -0.43 -0.61

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1:  Children who have lost at least one parent from all causes￿relevant shares. 
 
Source: Ministry of Health et al. 2002 and author￿s calculations based on shares of 
maternal to paternal to double orphans of 25-50-25. These shares were obtained from 
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Figure 2: Estimated dependency ratios. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
TRANSITION MATRIX ESTIMATION 
 
 
Sets /set elements/: 
te /1996*1999/  Time periods used in estimation 
d /upper, middle, lower/  Discrete distribution points 
i /births, notschool, ep1, ep2, esg1_2, tertiary, 
unskilled, skilled, hskilled, exit, lab_force/ 
Categories of population by activity 
notest(i) /births, exit/  Categories for which values are not 
estimated 
p(i) and pp(i) /notschool, ep1, ep2, esg1_2, 
tertiary, unskilled, skilled, hskilled, exit/ 
Categories associated with transition 
probabilities 
pe(p) /notschool, ep1, ep2, esg1_2, tertiary, 
unskilled, skilled, hskilled/ 
All categories in set p but exit 
k(i) / notschool, ep1, ep2, esg1_2, tertiary, 
lab_force/ 
Categories with values for data 
constraints 




pp p q ,   Prior probability values 
it val   Data for estimations 
dit v   Prior bounds on estimated values 
pt birth   Births in each period 
delta  A very small number 
 
Variables: 
Z Objective  value 
ip i r ,   Posterior probabilities for transition matrix 
dit s   Posterior probabilities for error terms 
it esval   Estimated values 
it ehat   Error term on known items 
 
Equations: 
Minimize Z subject to:  Description
∑∑ ∑∑∑ + + + =
pp p d
te k d te k d
kt e
pp p pp p pp p delta s s delta q r r Z ) ln( * ) / ln( * , , , , , , ,   Objective  
∑ + = +
pp




te uk te force lab estval estval , ,   Total labor 
force  
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te k te k te k ehat estval val , , , + =   Defining 
the error 1 
∑ =
d
te k d te k d te k v s ehat , , , , , *   Defining 
the error 2 
∑ =
pp
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APPENDIX B 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF REVISED HIV PREVALENCE RATE ESTIMATES 
 
As indicated in the Introduction and as shown in Table 1, updated information on HIV 
prevalence rates was obtained for 2000. Estimated prevalence rates were revised 
significantly downwards in all Northern provinces, stayed roughly constant in most 
Central provinces (Zambezia excepted), and rose slightly in most Southern provinces. At 
the national level, the adult HIV prevalence rate was revised downwards from 16% to 
12.2%. These revised prevalence rate estimates form the basis for the revised set of 
demographic projections that serve as an exogenous input into the economic models 
employed here.  
 
Since the old set of projections generated considerable interest, it is worth examining the 
differences in demographic outcomes between the two sets and exploring how those 
differences might translate into changes in economic impact. The differences, in 2010, 
between the old and the revised set of demographic projections are illustrated in Tables 
C1-C6. These differences are less striking than the differences for the year 2000 depicted 
in Table 1. At the national level, the adult HIV prevalence rate in 2010 is projected to be 
only slightly lower (less than one percentage point versus nearly four percentage points in 
2000) than the earlier set of projections indicated (see Table B5).  
 
The reduction in the divergence between the two sets of projections by 2010 stems from a 
fairly rapid growth in prevalence rates in the North and a significant increase in the 
severity of the pandemic in the South. In the North, the revised projections foresee adult 
HIV prevalence rates more than doubling over the 2000 to 2010 period (as opposed to 
staying relatively constant in the older set). However, due to the time lags between 
infection and the onset of AIDS, the AIDS case rate, which drives economic impacts, in 
the North lags the growth in prevalence rates (see Table B-6). In the South, AIDS related 
indicators (the adult AIDS case rate as a share of the adult population and the adult HIV 
prevalence rate) worsen by about 20% by 2010 compared with the older set of 
projections. Essentially, the revised demographic projections indicate a less severe but 
rapidly worsening situation in the North and a more severe pandemic in the South. 
Projections for the central provinces are somewhat milder overall but this effect is due 
almost exclusively to Zambezia where the pandemic appears to be unfolding in a manner 
similar to the northern provinces. 
 
In terms of economic impact, the shifts in the regional distribution of the pandemic are 
worth highlighting. While the northern provinces contained about one third of the 
population in 1997, they only accounted for about 20% of gross domestic product (GDP) 
(Sulemane, 2000). On the other hand, the southern provinces, while containing only 
about 26% of the population, accounted for about 50% of GDP in 1997.  
 
In the CGE model, these changes in the regional distribution of the pandemic are 
captured rather crudely through the technology parameters. As indicated earlier, growth 
in technology for agricultural sectors is driven by AIDS death rates in the Central and  
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Northern provinces. AIDS deaths in the Southern provinces drive technological progress 
in non-agricultural sectors. So, if the two sets of projections are entered into the model 
and compared, the differences in terms of economic impact will be less profound than the 
national numbers indicate due to the disproportionate economic weight of the South. 
 
Table B7 compares major economic results for the two sets of demographic projections 
for the Base AIDS scenario. Under the old set of projections, the size of the overall 
economy is smaller due to a more severe AIDS pandemic at the national level. However, 
the regional impacts discussed above mitigate the difference. In addition, these regional 
effects make for a slightly stronger negative impact on per capita GDP in the revised 
demographic scenario.  
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Old Revised % Difference
Country 19,356,778 20,116,505 3.9%
Men 9,414,815 9,776,871 3.8%
Women 9,941,966 10,339,635 4.0%
North 6,458,003 6,866,171 6.3%
Central 7,711,780 8,108,664 5.1%
South 5,186,995 5,141,670 -0.9%
Old Revised % Difference
Country 11,371,783 11,770,073 3.5%
Men 5,424,437 5,605,580 3.3%
Women 5,947,342 6,164,493 3.7%
North 3,786,348 4,001,829 5.7%
Central 4,407,482 4,615,211 4.7%
South 3,177,953 3,153,033 -0.8%
Old Revised % Difference
Country 1,960,414 1,926,543 -1.7%
Men 878,248 859,099 -2.2%
Women 1,082,167 1,067,443 -1.4%
North 550,259 516,154 -6.2%
Central 964,758 876,133 -9.2%
South 445,397 534,256 20.0% 
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Table B6: Share of adult AIDS cases in the adult population in 2010. 
 
 
Old Revised % Difference
Country 176,312 169,732 -3.7%
Men 78,933 75,420 -4.5%
Women 97,378 94,312 -3.1%
North 48,928 42,901 -12.3%
Central 87,229 78,450 -10.1%
South 40,155 48,381 20.5%
Old Revised % Difference
Country 16.0% 15.2% -5.0%
Men 14.9% 14.1% -5.4%
Women 17.1% 16.3% -4.7%
North 13.5% 12.1% -10.9%
Central 20.3% 17.6% -13.4%
South 13.1% 15.9% 20.8%
Old Revised % Difference
Country 1.3% 1.2% -6.8%
Men 1.2% 1.1% -7.4%
Women 1.4% 1.3% -6.3%
North 1.1% 0.9% -16.9%
Central 1.7% 1.4% -14.1%
South 1.1% 1.3% 21.6% 
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APPENDIX C 
 
NET PRESENT VALUE CALCULATIONS 
 
 
Table C1 illustrates the calculations employed to determine the economically justifiable 
levels of investment in preventive policy. The calculations were quite similar for 
education policy. For preventive policy, the perspective taken is that of one person whose 
income in 2010 is normalized to 100. The per capita income of this person evolves for the 
period 2002 to 2010 as in the Base AIDS scenario. The person is assumed not to be HIV 
positive and is assumed to have no chance of becoming HIV positive. Furthermore, this 
person does not care about any of the social or human costs of the AIDS pandemic. 
Nevertheless, roughly consistent with model results, the worker reaps income benefits 
from effective prevention policy in the period 2011 to 2020 in the form of a 0.3% 
increment to the growth rate of income.  
 
Under these restrictive assumptions, this person is willing to invest 2.5% of income for 
the period 2002 to 2007 and a linearly declining share of income from 2008 to 2010 in 
order to obtain the increment to income growth during the period 2011 to 2020. 
Multiplication by population yields the same investment level as a share of GDP. 
Obviously, consideration of additional costs, such as the likelihood of contracting HIV 
and the social costs of the pandemic, would yield a higher investment figure. 
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Table C1: Net present value calculation on a per capita basis. 
 
1Per capita income is normalized to 100 in year 2010 in both scenarios. 
2For 2002 to 2010, the net column illustrates the investment from base income, as a constant share of income 
from 2002 to 2007 and declining linearly from 2008 to 2010, that one would be willing to pay in order to obtain 
the increased income flow shown in the net column from 2011 to 2040. The net present value of the net column 
is zero and the share of income invested from 2002 to 2007 is 2.5%. 
Net
2
Prevention Base Prevention Base
2002 75.8 75.8 -1.9
2003 80.9 80.9 -2.0
2004 84.8 84.8 -2.1
2005 86.7 86.7 -2.2
2006 88.8 88.8 -2.2
2007 91.2 91.2 -2.3
2008 94.6 94.6 -1.8
2009 97.7 97.7 -1.2
2010 100.0 100.0 0.028 0.025 -0.6
2011 102.8 102.5 0.028 0.025 0.3
2012 105.7 105.1 0.028 0.025 0.6
2013 108.6 107.7 0.028 0.025 0.9
2014 111.7 110.4 0.028 0.025 1.3
2015 114.8 113.1 0.028 0.025 1.7
2016 118.0 116.0 0.028 0.025 2.1
2017 121.3 118.9 0.028 0.025 2.5
2018 124.7 121.8 0.028 0.025 2.9
2019 128.2 124.9 0.028 0.025 3.3
2020 131.8 128.0 0.028 0.028 3.8
2021 135.5 131.6 0.028 0.028 3.9
2022 139.3 135.3 0.028 0.028 4.0
2023 143.2 139.1 0.028 0.028 4.1
~    ~    ~    ~    ~    ~   
2038 216.7 210.4 0.028 0.028 6.2
2039 222.7 216.3 0.028 0.028 6.4
2040 229.0 222.4 0.028 0.028 6.6
Per Capita Income
1 Assumed Growth 
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